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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND THE WISCONSIN
CONSTITUTION
CHAD M. OLDFATHER*
In recent years the Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided several highprofile cases concerning the separation of powers under the state constitution.
In the abstract, questions concerning the separation of powers do not seem
inherently partisan, largely because the partisan balance of government will
shift over time. Yet, as has been the case with many of its recent decisions, the
justices’ votes have broken along what most observers regard as partisan lines,
and the opinions have featured heated prose including accusations of result
orientation and methodological illegitimacy.
This Article is the initial product of an effort to read, and attempt to
synthesize, the entirety of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s output relating to
separation of powers dating back to the state’s founding. It advances no single
thesis and makes no grand claims. It instead seeks to identify some threads
running through the caselaw, including with respect to the court’s approaches
to interpreting the state constitution, to highlight some tensions, oversights, and
loose ends in the doctrine, and to suggest that the court’s perceived legitimacy
would benefit from more humility and less heated rhetoric.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is the product of an effort to read, as comprehensively as I
could manage, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s opinions concerning the
separation of powers under the state’s constitution.1 The goal of that quest was
not to advance a particular thesis or even to answer a specific question, but
rather to follow the materials where they led, and to leverage one of the
comparative advantages I enjoy as an academic—the ability to read, think, and
write without being subject to the constraints imposed by having to do so under
pressing time constraints or in the context of a specific dispute. I hoped to
uncover themes, to notice connections and disconnections, to identify shifts in
the jurisprudential currents over the 173 years separating the framing of the
state’s constitution and today, and to otherwise bring unnoticed or
underappreciated issues to the surface.
My motivations for undertaking this project included the following. First,
the court is widely perceived as having become a partisan institution. Writing
in The New Yorker, Lincoln Caplan observed that “all of the Wisconsin justices
look a lot like politicians” and characterized the court as having been
transformed “from one of the nation’s most respected state tribunals into a

1. I began with a Westlaw search designed to yield every opinion in which the phrase “separation
of powers” appeared, then read those in chronological order, together with other seemingly notable
opinions that were cited along the way. Given the wide range of questions that have implications for
the separation of powers, the set of opinions I read undoubtedly fell short of full comprehensiveness.
Not all the opinions were significant, and not all of the opinions that were in some sense significant
are discussed or even cited in this Article.

OLDFATHER_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

WISCONSIN SEPARATION OF POWERS

847

disgraceful mess.”2 Former talk-radio personality Charlie Sykes described
Wisconsin as a place where “the lines between partisan politics and the
judiciary have long since been erased.”3 One justice has been pilloried for not
consistently voting with his perceived ideological comrades.4 This is all
troubling, and it seems to have obscured what ought to be a mundane
observation: The rule of law means that one’s side doesn’t always win—
whether “side” is defined in terms of politics, interest groups, or some other
categorization.
Second, separation-of-powers issues do not, in the abstract, necessarily
cleave along partisan lines. One of the purposes of separation of powers is to
prevent the concentration of power, and in that sense we might, as a general
matter, conclude that those who favor limited government will also tend to
prefer robust separation. But that general dynamic does not so clearly extend
to more specific questions. Should the governor’s partial veto power be more
or less extensive? To what extent should the courts defer to the legislature’s
assessments of the constitutionality of its own legislation? To what extent
ought the legislature be able to continue to assert its assessment in litigation?
If it is able to do so, does it matter whether the legislature’s litigation positions
are directed by a committee that may not reflect the views of the legislature as
a whole? Viewed without regard to the partisan affiliation of the holders of the
offices at the time the questions arise, it’s not so clear which side of those issues
2. Lincoln Caplan, The Destruction of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, THE NEW YORKER (May
5, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-destruction-of-the-wisconsin-supremecourt [https://perma.cc/8LL9-QNPN]. The sentiment isn’t limited to journalists. A few years ago, I
presented at a conference held for appellate judges and justices from state courts across the country.
Several times in conversations during breaks a member of another state’s judiciary would ask a version
of the question, “What happened to the Wisconsin Supreme Court?” One pointedly said, “We used to
look up to that court.”
3. Charles Sykes, What’s Really Behind Wisconsin’s Election Disaster, POLITICO (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/04/09/wisconsin-supreme-court-partisanbattleground-176292 [https://perma.cc/M6KZ-6BTA]; See also Dave Zweifel, Plain Talk: Wisconsin
Gets the Derision it Deserves for its Partisan Supreme Court, THE CAPITAL TIMES (May 11, 2020),
https://madison.com/ct/opinion/column/dave_zweifel/plain-talk-wisconsin-gets-the-derision-itdeserves-for-its-partisan-supreme-court/article_605244c2-89d0-5895-bfba-132a8a0dd9ea.html
[https://perma.cc/2W46-DNSJ].
4. See, e.g., Dan O’Donnell, Brian Hagedorn Has Become Everything Brian Hagedorn Warned
Us About, MACIVER INSTITUTE (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.maciverinstitute.com/2020/12/brianhagedorn-has-become-everything-brian-hagedorn-warned-us-about/ [https://perma.cc/6AN9-V4KD].
O’Donnell, a talk-radio host, describes Hagedorn as “a constitutional illiterate who twists himself into
laughably unsupported knots in order to arrive at the predetermined policy outcome he personally
prefers.” For an overview of the attacks on Hagedorn, see Reid J. Epstein, A Conservative Justice in
Wisconsin Says He Followed the Law, Not the Politics, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 20, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/20/us/politics/wisconsin-justice-brian-hagedorn.html
[https://perma.cc/V3HJ-W8SG].

OLDFATHER_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

848

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:845

is “conservative,” and which is “liberal,” whatever definitions of those terms
one might choose.
And yet the court’s decisions in cases presenting those questions, and the
voting patterns of the justices within the cases, suggest that the current partisan
affiliations of the relevant office holders have influenced the court’s approach.
At least on the surface, the justices’ voting patterns appear in general to reflect
a crude attitudinalism—the party, whether the governor or the legislature, that
shares the same perceived ideology as a given justice is overwhelmingly likely,
particularly in high-profile cases, to get that justice’s vote. Indeed, the
following proposition seems simultaneously unremarkable and scandalous: If
the partisan affiliations had been reversed, so, too, would be the results.5 To
say that is not to say that the justices perceived themselves as acting in anything
but good faith. But judges are humans, and human judgment can be swayed by
the salient features of specific situations. As Justice Jackson famously put the
point:
The opinions of judges, no less than executives and publicists,
often suffer the infirmity of confusing the issue of a power’s
validity with the cause it is invoked to promote . . . . The
tendency is strong to emphasize transient results upon
policies . . . and lose sight of enduring consequences upon the
balanced power structure of our Republic.6
However, the participants in these episodes have subjectively experienced their
motivations, the appearance is one of prioritizing partisan advantage over
adherence to the longer-term norms and values on which our system of
government depends.7
Third, there are aspects of the court’s opinions that simply seem off in ways
that are more traditionally legal in nature. For example, the court purports to
adhere to analytical frameworks—such as for statutory and constitutional
interpretation, and for the implementation of stare decisis—that its majority
opinions occasionally disregard. And often, in interpreting the Wisconsin
constitution, the justices appear to reflexively assume that the United States
Constitution provides the model against which its state-level counterpart should
5. To be sure, such a counterfactual world would almost certainly have generated a different mix
of cases. The interest groups involved in advancing this sort of litigation would have different sets of
concerns—few are concerned by the perceived accumulation of power when it’s their side that holds
the power—and brought different cases, and the court would likely have focused on different issues.
6. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
7. As Miriam Seifter has put the point in addressing these phenomena across a range of states,
“These developments have in common a willingness by state officials to alter or strain the institutions
of state government—the so-called ‘rules of the game’—for short-term political advantage.” Miriam
Seifter, Judging Powers Plays in the American States, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (2019).
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be measured and to which it should conform. This despite the fact that the
Wisconsin constitution was adopted over a half-century later and creates a
facially different set of institutional arrangements for a government that
occupies a different place in the federal structure and serves a different purpose.
The Article begins by tracing the history of the court’s approach to the
interpretation of the Wisconsin constitution. Although these interpretive
questions do not implicate the separation of powers in a narrow sense, they do
in the broader respect that the court’s orientation to the constitution affects the
space left to the legislative and executive branches for them to engage in their
own interpretation. The Article then provides a critical assessment of a
selection of the court’s opinions addressing separation-of-powers issues from
the past two decades. After doing so it considers some of the general issues
raised by the court’s recent cases, including the appropriateness of using federal
precedent as a guide. It also returns to the court’s interpretive history, which
reveals that for much of the state’s history, the court’s approach to interpreting
the constitution has been methodologically pluralistic, and that only recently
has the court purported to follow an interpretive formula. Even more recently
some of the justices have taken to routinely charging their colleagues with
engaging in result-oriented or otherwise illegitimate decision making, which
only serves to feed the impression that other factors motivated their decisions
(including those of the justices who make the charges).
II. INTERPRETING THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION
Although the point is not acknowledged in the case law, and appears to be
the product of happenstance rather than design, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
uses two, or perhaps three, interpretive frameworks when addressing questions
about the meaning of the state’s constitution.8 The first applies in situations in
which there is a textual provision to be interpreted—other than ones in the
Declaration of Rights for which there is a counterpart in the federal Bill of
Rights, to which the second applies. The third applies to separation-of-powers
issues.
As we will see, however, the foregoing description is too simplistic in its
categories and its apparent comprehensiveness. The court’s opinions often
confidently invoke an interpretive framework, giving the impression within
8. I have elsewhere addressed such “methodological stare decisis” with respect to the
interpretation of the federal Constitution. See Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Pluralism and
Constitutional Interpretation, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2014); Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Stare
Decisis and Constitutional Interpretation, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
135 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013). Because, as noted below, a state constitution may be a different
type of thing than the federal Constitution, the analysis may not fully transfer from one context to the
other.
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those opinions that its approach is settled and fixed. Across the range of its
decisions, however, the court’s approach appears more clearly pluralistic in
nature. The court on occasion departs from these frameworks to engage in a
more freewheeling, ad hoc approach. Because it does not provide reasons for
its departures, and has not addressed the relationship among the approaches, the
impression is often one of opportunism.
A. The General Approach
The Wisconsin constitution was ratified in 1848, and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s work of interpreting the document began in January of 1849,
in two cases that arose out of election disputes, and which concerned the
relationship between those who held territorial office and those who would hold
office under the constitution. A leading treatise on the Wisconsin constitution
contends that the court used a different approach to interpretation in the two
cases. “Thus, after two constitutional cases there were two methods of
interpretation: one based on determining, in a very general way, the relevant
constitutional provision’s intent, the other based on literally reading the
constitution’s relevant provision.”9
Careful consideration of the two opinions suggests that this reading is, at
best, overstated. The opinions are short, and neither analysis is detailed or
expansive. Moreover, both were written by Chief Judge Alexander Stow.
Given their common authorship, the existence of differences between them
suggests not the existence of two distinct approaches so much as the embrace
of the methodological pluralism of the common-law judge, pursuant to which
interpretation is not an ostensibly algorithmic process of plugging the available
materials into a set formula but rather a task that entails selecting the right tools
for the task at hand. And the task at hand was fundamentally different in the
two cases.
The first of the cases is State ex rel. Dunning v. Giles, in which the court
confronted a claim brought by the runner-up in an election for sheriff of Dane
County.10 Dunning, the claimant, contended that Matts, who received the most
votes, was:
[R]endered ineligible either by the second section of the
seventh article of the Constitution, which declares “that
sheriffs shall hold no other office, and be ineligible for two
years next succeeding the termination of their offices,” or by
the similar provision of the territorial law, which, it is said, not

9. JACK STARK & STEVE MILLER, THE WISCONSIN STATE CONSTITUTION 12 (2d ed. 2019).
10. 1 Chand. 112 (1849).
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being repugnant to the constitution, was continued in force by
the second section of the constitutional schedule.11
In other words, Dunning argued that because the adoption of the constitution
brought Matts’s term under the territorial law to a conclusion, he was ineligible
to be a candidate. The court, reasoning broadly from its understanding of the
nature and function of the constitution, concluded that application of the
territorial prohibition, which applied to inhabitants of the Wisconsin territory,
would be repugnant to the constitution, which applied to citizens of the state of
Wisconsin, even though (as the court acknowledged) both provisions were
identical:
The constitution did not perpetuate or modify any of the
political rights of the inhabitants of the territory, for, properly
speaking, they had none; but it created those rights for the
citizens of the state—for all citizens—without preference or
exclusion. All were alike its framers, and were equally
enfranchised by it; and it seems to me harsh and invidious to
say that some five-and-twenty of its citizens should be
excluded from any of its privileges by the circumstance of their
happening to hold, at the time of its adoption, a particular office
under the expiring government.12
Because the text of the constitution did not speak to the question, textual
interpretation could not supply the answer. The analysis instead required extraconstitutional reasoning—drawing conclusions about the very nature of the
document, the obligations it created, and the rights it conferred, and to whom
and at what times.
The second case, State ex rel. Bond v. French,13 likewise arose out of an
election contest. The winner of the election for probate judge in Racine County
sought a writ of mandamus compelling the holder of the position under the
territorial government, who maintained the job was still his, to “deliver the
books and muniments of the office.”14 The incumbent’s first argument was that
elections for probate judges were not properly authorized by the statute
providing for the state’s first general election.15 The court concluded that the
best reading of the constitution and statute allowed for the election.16 But it
also added this:

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 169.
Id. at 170 (emphasis omitted).
1 Chand. 130 (1849).
Id. at 131.
Id.
Id. at 133.
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But did the matter admit of a doubt in the first instance, that
doubt should be regarded as removed by the action which has
been had under this act. While this Court will never allow its
judgements to be influenced by popular opinion, the united
understanding and action of the whole State, in a matter of
great public interest, is a guide that any tribunal may safely
follow.17
The second argument was that the constitution did not authorize the election
of probate judges as part of a general election.18 Here, in contrast to Dunning,
there was an applicable bit of text to interpret. Article VII, § 9 of the
constitution provided, “There shall be no election for a judge or judges at any
general election, for state or county officers, nor within thirty days either before
or after such election.”19 The question thus was whether probate judges fell
within the scope of the word “judge” as used in that provision. The court
opened its analysis with the proposition that interpretation of the constitution is
to “be governed by the same general rules of interpretation which prevail in
relation to statutes.”20 A few pages earlier the court had described that process
one in which the meaning of a statute is to be determined “not only by its own
words, but by a reference to the supposed object of the Legislature in passing
it, and the subject of Legislation.”21 And indeed the court rejected the
incumbent’s claim based not so much on a formalistic analysis of the text as its
conclusions about the function the text was meant to serve:
If [the incumbent’s argument] be so, it necessarily follows that
all officers who are, for any purpose, made judges by the
Constitution, are Judges within the provision under
consideration; a construction which would prohibit the election
of Senators and Assemblymen (who are judges of the election
of their own members,) at a general election—a proposition
that no one would probably venture to advance. Again, by a
similar process of reasoning it might be contended, that the
Judges of the Supreme Court, which after five years, the
Legislature is authorized to establish, might be elected at a
general election; because, in the Constitution, they are not
called Judges, but a Chief Justice and Associate Justices; and
yet it is presumed that no person can entertain such an idea.22
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 134.
Id.
WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 9.
French, 1 Chand. at 135.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 135.
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Seven years later, the court confronted another election dispute, this time
over the governorship, in Attorney General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow.23 Both
Barstow, the incumbent, and Bashford, the challenger, claimed victory, with
Bashford credibly claiming that fraudulent votes accounted for Bartow’s
apparent victory.24 Bashford asked the court to disregard the suspect votes and
declare him the winner, and Barstow responded by arguing that the court lacked
the power to hear the case.25 More specifically, Barstow contended that
separation of powers entailed complete independence, and that the granting of
executive power to the governor meant “that the person filling the office of
governor had the authority to determine his right to the office.”26 The court,
however, was “unable to find anything in the constitution, or in the nature of
executive power, which can be relied upon to sustain this position.”27 Its
reasoning included some consideration of the text of the constitution, but also
the nature and location of sovereignty and of the powers of the government in
general.28 The court’s analysis ultimately reduces to no pat methodology, no
running of materials through some decisional algorithm, but rather a thorough
exploration and assessment of the pertinent legal materials. The goal—to
determine the meaning of the state constitution29—defines the task, and the
court’s job is to sift through and weigh the evidence that assists in its
completion.
A pair of opinions by Chief Justice Dixon further illustrates the approach.
In 1860, in Lumsden v. Cross,30 he wrote:
It is our duty to give such a construction to the constitution as
will make it consistent with itself, and will harmonize and give
effect to all its various provisions. To do this, we have only to
suppose that the convention used language with reference to its
popular and received signification; and applied it as it had been
practically applied for a long series of years.31

23. 4 Wis. 567 (1855).
24. For a brief description of the events, see JOSEPH A. RANNEY, WISCONSIN AND THE SHAPING
OF AMERICAN LAW 28 (2017).
25. Attorney General ex rel. Bashford, 4 Wis. at 567.
26. Id. at 671.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 674.
29. Id. at 656–57 (placing the resolution of the question before the court in the state constitution
itself).
30. 10 Wis. 282 (1860).
31. Id. at 287–88.
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Fourteen years later, in State v. West Wisconsin Railway Co.,32 the court
rejected a claim that it should regard the scope of its jurisdiction as defined
according to the common law writ of quo warranto, the precise use and contours
of which the court regarded as lost to the mists of time:
The futility and unreasonableness of all such interpretations of
the constitution are apparent. It is as impossible to believe that
the framers of the constitution were looking back over the
period of three or four hundred years into the middle ages,
designing to give this court such jurisdiction, and only such, as
was then exercised in virtue of the writ of quo warranto, as it
is that they intended to confine the court to that antiquated and
useless process. The framers of the constitution were practical
men, and were aiming at practical and useful results.33
In 1874, the court also decided Attorney General v. Chicago and
Northwestern Railway Company, a case in which the attorney general sought
to enjoin two railroad companies from charging rates in excess of those
mandated by statute.34 Among the questions before the court was whether the
constitution gave it original jurisdiction over the case.35 In an opinion by Chief
Justice Ryan, who had been a delegate to the 1846 constitutional convention,
the court began by parsing the language of the pertinent constitutional
provision.36 The problem was technical, and one that is largely unfamiliar to
modern ears. The constitution gave the court jurisdiction over cases involving
certain writs, all but one of which, under the common law, “were prerogative
writs, issuing on behalf of the state only.”37 Injunctions, by contrast, were
judicial writs.
“And the difficulty arises wholly from placing this
nonjurisdictional writ . . . amongst original writs; this equitable writ of vague
and varied application amongst common law writs of sharp and terse
significance; this confusion of equitable and legal jurisdiction.”38 This
placement raised a host of questions, and, the court lamented, “The writ does
not of itself, like the rest of the group of writs given, furnish an answer to these
questions.”39

32. 34 Wis. 197 (1874).
33. Id. at 212.
34. 35 Wis. 425 (1874).
35. Id. at 512.
36. Id. (considering Article VII, § 3, cl. 4 of the Wisconsin constitution, which gave the court
original jurisdiction and power “to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto,
certiorari, and other original and remedial writs”).
37. Id. at 513.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 514.
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The court considered the parties’ arguments and found them wanting.40 It
considered the text, it considered the implications of the structure created by
the text and the role of the court within that structure, it drew on its own past
opinions and those “of other courts on kindred subjects,”41 and it drew upon
authoritative statements of common law principles. And it concluded that the
constitution had done something entirely new:
For, in our view of its use, the injunction given to this court
seems to become a quasi prerogative writ, and founds
jurisdiction as if it were an original writ. It is certainly
competent for the constitution to give new writs, or to put old
writs to new uses; to make any writ, by the use to which it puts
it, prerogative or original; and to found jurisdiction on any writ,
as in case of a prerogative or original writ. And this it appears
to have done, in effect, with the injunction which it gives to
this court.42
History mattered, but history did not constrain. The constitution might use old
language, but it could put it to new uses.
The 1892 case of State v. Cunningham,43 though, reminds of the need to be
mindful of the constitution’s plain language:
It is to be remembered that even praiseworthy objects cannot
be rightfully attained by a violation of law. Every effort to
fritter away the plain language of the constitution, by way of
construction or otherwise, even to secure a desirable end, is
nothing less than an insidious attempt to undermine the
fundamental law of the state, and hence to that extent
destructive of good government, besides being vicious in its
tendencies.44
A pair of cases, both from 1896, provide additional perspective. Both
Dowling v. Lancashire Insurance Company45 and In re Village of North
Milwaukee46 involved the nondelegation doctrine. In both cases the court’s
legal analysis centered on surveying cases from courts in other states. The
implicit understanding seemed to be that the pertinent task was to draw upon a
sort of state constitutional common law rather than to engage in a sustained way

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 514–16.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 520.
82 Wis. 39, 51 N.W. 1133 (1892).
Id. at 48.
92 Wis. 63, 65 N.W. 738 (1896).
93 Wis. 616, 67 N.W. 1033 (1896).
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with the language of the Wisconsin constitution (which is sparse when it comes
to the separation of powers) or with its history.
That there are broad similarities in the approaches taken by the court across
this range of cases should not surprise us. It would be strange to expect
anything less from fully situated members of a professional community
engaged in variations on the same task.47 But what’s clearly not present in the
opinions is any consensus that there is a single, correct methodology by which
to approach questions of constitutional interpretation, or any sense that the
absence of such a consensus somehow imperils the legitimacy of the enterprise.
To derive a single method from these cases would be to impose a pattern on a
world that resists it. The explanation may be that these were all judges familiar
with the workings of the common law and with the accordingly ad hoc (which
is not to say unconstrained) way by which such judges selected analytical tools
appropriate, in their professional judgment, to the task at hand. Or it may be
something else. The phenomenon’s explanation is less important than its
existence.
Perhaps the best encapsulation of the spirit of this history, which might
serve as the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s version of “we must never forget, it is
a constitution we are expounding,”48 comes via the following quote:
Much less should those state officials upon whom rests the
duty of interpreting the state Constitution derive from the
words of that Constitution implications which impair the
authority of the state to exercise the just and ordinary powers
usually possessed by governments, and which implications
would recognize within the state persons or corporations not
subject to or capable of ordinary regulation by the state, and
presuppose that by the adoption of the Constitution the state so
manacled itself as to be helpless to exercise old and wellknown governmental powers, or to apply such powers to new
problems or new conditions. Such construction would make
the mere implications of the Constitution greater than the
Constitution itself, and would lose sight of the main and
paramount purpose of the creation of the state and the adoption
of its Constitution. A Constitution so construed would last
only so long as it took to bring about an amendment or a new
Constitution, made possibly in the heat of conflict, and
therefore in all probability less wise and equitable than the old
Constitution properly construed. This is called by counsel the
47. For a brief discussion of this idea, see Chad M. Oldfather, Aesthetic Judging and the
Constitution (Or, Why Supreme Court Justices are Less Like Umpires and More Like Figure-Skating
Judges), 72 FLA. L. REV. 291, 401–03 (2020).
48. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
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doctrine of expediency; but we think it the doctrine of common
sense, that forbids implications from an instrument which tend
to render nugatory or to destroy that instrument.49
What matters, on this view, is that a constitution is meant to create a
government that is adequate to the task of governing. It recognizes that the
nature of that task will change over time in ways that are both foreseeable and
not.50 The committed originalist will, at this point, raise some version of the
argument that to treat the constitution other than as a document whose meaning
is to be extracted through an originalist approach is to treat it as something other
than law. But, the response runs, surely those justices who interpreted the
constitution in the early decades of statehood understood themselves to be
engaged in a fundamentally legal activity, and they had just as good an idea
(and arguably quite a better one) of the nature of the state constitution and what
it means to treat the Wisconsin constitution as law as any member of the legal
profession today.
Whatever the implications, it is clear that in the early decades of the state,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court neither purported to follow some uniform
methodology for interpreting the state constitution nor justified its decisions
with reasoning that implicitly adhered to some unstated framework. Consider,
by contrast, Thomas Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, first published in
1868 and unquestionably the leading treatise on state constitutional law
throughout its many editions.51 Cooley’s stated aim was descriptive. As he put
it, “the author further stated that he had faithfully endeavored to give the law as
it had been settled by the authorities, rather than to present his own views.”52
Cooley’s work provides the best evidence of the general state of state
constitutional law53 at the time the Wisconsin constitution was adopted.
49. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Wis., 136 Wis. 146, 159, 116 N.W.
905, 910 (1908).
50. State ex rel Sachtjen v. Festge, 25 Wis.2d 128, 130 N.W.2d 457, 463 (1964) (“We recognize,
of course, that many provisions in a constitution must be interpreted in the light of changing social
conditions and circumstances and the emergence of new problems. Illustrations are readily found in
the broad concepts which are put into words as ‘due process of law,’ ‘equal protection of the laws,’
and ‘power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states’ found in the
Federal constitution.”).
51. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).
52. Id. at v. No such endeavor can be entirely successful, of course, because any effort to make
sense of a mass of information, whether judicial opinions or otherwise, will be influenced by an
author’s predilections, whether consciously or not. Cooley implicitly acknowledges as much toward
the beginning of his discussion of constitutional interpretation, where he notes the existence of “sound”
versus “altogether arbitrary or fanciful” and “important” versus other rules of construction. Id. at 38–
39.
53. See infra Section II.
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In its outlines, the methodology that Cooley describes parallels the earliest
versions of what we now describe as originalism.54 Cooley assumes that a state
constitution is in all relevant respects just another written legal instrument, and
that therefore the rules for dealing with other written instruments apply to state
constitutions as well.55 A constitution’s meaning is accordingly fixed, it “is not
to be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at some subsequent time
when the circumstances may have so changed as perhaps to make a different
rule in the case seem desirable.”56 The measure by which to gauge that meaning
is intent: “In the case of all written laws, it is the intent of the lawgiver that is
to be enforced.”57 If possible, that intent must be extracted from the words of
the document itself, with pertinent language to be examined both on its own
terms and in light of the document as a whole.58 Yet in doing so both history59
and the common law60 are to be accounted for. General grants of power are to
be read as implying subsidiary powers.61 And only if ambiguity remains after
consideration of the foregoing is it appropriate to resort to “extrinsic” evidence
of meaning—things like the purpose of the provision in question,62 the

54. For an argument that the Wisconsin Supreme Court should employ an interpretive approach
to the state constitution that in its general contours parallels that described by Cooley, see Daniel R.
Suhr, Interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 93 (2013). In contrast to Cooley,
Suhr makes a normative argument, which is grounded in a utilitarian or pragmatic claim that the court’s
current methodology provides an insufficiently reliable approach to uncovering the intent behind the
document. Id. at 95. For a sophisticated exploration of the connection between Cooley’s treatise and
contemporary originalist theory, see Lawrence B. Solum, Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations and
Constitutional Originalism, 18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49 (2020).
55. COOLEY, supra note 51, at 38–39.
56. Id. at 54.
57. Id. at 55.
58. Id. at 57.
59. Id. at 58–59 (“But it must not be forgotten, in construing our constitutions, that in many
particulars they are but the legitimate successors of the great charters of English liberty, whose
provisions declaratory of the rights of the subject have acquired a well-understood meaning, which the
people must be supposed to have had in view in adopting them.”).
60. Id. at 60–61 (“By this we do not mean that the common law is to control the constitution, or
that the latter is to be warped and perverted in its meaning in order that no inroads, or as few as possible,
may be made in the system of common-law rules, but only that for its definitions we are to draw from
that great fountain, and that, in judging what it means, we are to keep in mind that it is not the beginning
of law for the State, but that it assumes the existence of a well-understood system, which is still to be
remain in force and be administered, but under such limitations and restrictions as that instrument
imposes.”)
61. Id. at 63–64 (“Under every constitution, implications must be resorted to, in order to carry
out the general grants of power. A constitution cannot from its very nature enter into a minute
specification of all the minor powers naturally and obviously included in and flowing from the great
and important ones which are expressly granted.”).
62. Id. at 65.

OLDFATHER_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

WISCONSIN SEPARATION OF POWERS

859

proceedings of the constitutional convention,63 and contemporaneous or
longstanding construction.64 It seems likely that the framers of the Wisconsin
constitution and early members of the court were aware of the approach Cooley
outlines, and that the justices were aware of his treatise when it appeared. And
yet the court’s opinions do not reflect that approach.
In contrast to the practice in its early decades, the current Wisconsin
Supreme Court purports to follow a consistent framework when interpreting the
state constitution. The court first adopted that framework in Busé v. Smith,65 in
which it portrayed itself as “committed to the method of analysis” used in its
opinion from two years prior in Board of Education v. Sinclair.66 This was a
curious beginning, since nothing about the opinion in Sinclair suggests that the
court regarded itself as operating according to some sort of one-size-fits-all
analysis, much less as creating the foundation for an analytical framework that
would endure for decades. Indeed, the Sinclair court’s analysis is striking for
the complete lack of authority it provides for approaching the question before
it in the way that it does. A reader of the opinion who did not know how it
would be used in the future would have no reason to regard it as anything other
than another in a line of somewhat ad hoc approaches to the interpretation of
the constitution, and not even an especially good exemplar of that.
Yet from this perhaps accidental beginning emerged a method that entails
consideration of three sources of information:
(1) The plain meaning of the words in the context used;
(2) The historical analysis of the constitutional debates and of
what practices were in existence in 1848, which the court may
reasonably presume were also known to the framers of the 1848
constitution; and
(3) The earliest interpretation of [the pertinent section of the
constitution] by the legislature as manifested in the first law
passed following the adoption of the constitution.67
Over time the framework has taken on a fourth element, which involves
consideration of “the prevailing practices when the provision was adopted.”68
If these factors do not provide an answer, “the meaning of a constitutional

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 67–71.
74 Wis.2d 550, 568, 247 N.W.2d 141, 149 (1976).
65 Wis.2d 179, 222 N.W.2d 143 (1974).
State v. Cunningham, 82 Wis. 39, 51 N.W. 1133 (1892) (citations omitted).
State v. Kerr, 2018 WI 87, ¶ 19, 383 Wis. 2d 306, 913 N.W.2d 787.
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provision may be determined by looking at the objectives of the framers in
adopting the provision.”69
B. Lockstep Interpretation of the Declaration of Rights
There are at least two situations in which the court has consistently departed
from the framework outlined in the preceding section. The first, which I will
only briefly address, is with respect to state constitutional rights that have a
counterpart in the federal Bill of Rights, even where there is a difference in the
language of the two provisions. There, the court has said, “decisions from the
United States Supreme Court interpreting analogous provisions in the federal
constitution ‘are eminent and highly persuasive, but not controlling,
authority.’”70 Yet when “the language of the provision in the state constitution
is ‘virtually identical’ to that of the federal provision or where no difference in
intent is discernible, Wisconsin courts have normally construed the state
constitution consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s construction of
the federal constitution.”71 The justification for what the court typically refers
to as its “lockstep” approach is primarily pragmatic, that interpreting the rights
in the Wisconsin constitution as having identical content to their federal
counterparts promotes the value of uniformity72—which, by implication, the
court regards as sufficient to override the values underlying its otherwise
applicable approach. This, then, represents an acknowledgement of the
proposition that pragmatic considerations are an appropriate component of
constitutional interpretation. Other justifications include a sense that there is
nothing unique about the state’s values that would justify providing greater
protection than already provided for under the federal constitution,73 and that it
is simply easier to rely on federal law because there is so much built-up caselaw
69. State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 138, 341 N.W.2d 668, 676 (1984).
70. State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶ 57, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 (quoting McCauley v.
Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 139, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963)).
71. Id. ¶ 58 (quoting State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶ 39, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142 (in
turn quoting State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 180–81, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999)).
72. Id. ¶ 59 (“This ‘lock-step’ theory of interpreting the Wisconsin Constitution no broader than
its federal counterpart appears to be aimed at promoting uniformity in the law.”).
73. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers
Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 79, 83 (1998) (noting that under a view of constitutional
interpretation as implementation of a polity’s values “it follows that the state charter can provide an
authentic source of constitutional meaning only if the constitution rests on a distinctive state
community”). For examples of cases in which state courts have concluded that their state’s values
support a departure from the federal baseline, see Sitz v. Department of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209
(Mich. 1993) (holding the use of sobriety checkpoints unconstitutional under the Michigan
constitution); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (holding that Alaskans have a right to privacy
under the state constitution that encompasses the possession and use of marijuana).
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to draw upon.74 It also relates to separation of powers in the sense that it
represents a form of judicial deference, which in turn leaves the state legislative
and executive branches the maximum available amount of flexibility to act as
they see fit.75
There are strong arguments against lockstep interpretation.76 The text of
the rights provisions in state constitutions are more often similar rather than
identical to those in the Bill of Rights, and even identically worded provisions
need not be interpreted to mean the same thing. They were adopted by distinct
sovereigns at different times, and often use general language that might
plausibly have different application in states with differing geographies and
cultures.77 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court may underenforce the
guarantees in the federal Bill of Rights as a product of the fact that federal
guarantees must be “one-size-fits-all,” leading it to apply a “federalism
discount” to its interpretations.78
C. Nontextual “Interpretation”—Separation of Powers
The second exception to the general framework concerns constitutional
questions that do not turn on an interpretation of the text, which includes, to a
greater or lesser degree, most separation of powers issues. Here things get
messy. The court sometimes engages in an analysis rooted in its general
framework. For example, in considering the constitutionality of so-called
“John Doe” proceedings, the court in State v. Unnamed Defendant79 opened its
analysis by reciting both its basic separation-of-powers approach (outlined

74. Schapiro, supra note 73. The basic idea is that the two sets of sources will often lead to the
same result, such that it’s not surprising that state court judges would take the easy route of following
federal law rather than going through the laborious process of doing an original analysis of state
materials that will almost always lead to the same conclusions. JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 50 (2005). There are undoubtedly resource-based constraints at work, too.
State supreme court justices lack the assistance that their counterparts at the United States Supreme
Court have, both in terms of their law clerks as well as, in most instances, the depth and breadth of
analysis provided by party and amicus briefs.
75. Schapiro, supra note 73, at 84 (noting that, because all state officials are bound by federal
protections of individual rights, “[a] different state constitutional standard can only impose additional
limits on official conduct”).
76. For an overview of the debate, see ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 193–232 (2009).
77. See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 174 (2018).
78. Id. at 175.
79. 150 Wis. 2d 352, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989).
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below) and the Busé framework, then noting “that not every constitutional
controversy can be resolved by simple reference to the intent of the framers.”80
As Chief Justice Winslow pointed out, the state constitution was not
intended to halt the race in its progress:
Where there is no express command or prohibition, but only
general language or policy to be considered, the conditions
prevailing at the time of its adoption must have their due
weight; but the changed social, economic, and governmental
conditions and ideals of the time, as well as the problems which
the changes have produced, must also logically enter into the
consideration, and become influential factors in the settlement
of problems of construction and interpretation.81
Still, the court continued, the intent of the framers “has special significance
when we are dealing with a matter which was demonstrably contemplated by
the framers.”82 Moreover, “[a]dded weight to the constitutional validity of this
procedure is given by the long and continuous use of the procedure since 1848,
and the uniform acquiescence in its constitutionality.”83
As is the case with its constitutional interpretation more generally, the court
in its early decades did not claim adherence to a specific methodology in its
separation-of-powers decisions. For example, in Dowling v. Lancashire Ins.
Co.,84 the court considered a statute purporting to delegate to the commissioner
of insurance the authority to adopt a standard policy of fire insurance, which
the statute required to “conform to the type and form of the New York standard
fire insurance policy.”85 The bulk of the court’s legal analysis involved
surveying cases from other state courts, undertaken on an implicit
understanding that there exists a shared notion of separation of powers under
state (not federal) constitutional law, including a conception of legislative

80. Id. at 699. The court in In re Constitutionality of Section 251.18, Wis. Statutes, 204 Wis.
501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931), considered a statute giving the supreme court the power to regulate practice
and procedure in Wisconsin courts but reserving to the legislature the right to repeal or change any
rules adopted by the court. It characterized its task as originalist: “The question as to what powers are
essentially judicial and what legislative is to be solved by ascertaining the definition and scope of such
powers at the time the Constitution was adopted.” Id. at 718. Its analysis, though, was only loosely
originalist. It surveyed an array of cases, from the United States Supreme Court as well as from other
states, before turning to the state of the law in the various territories that ultimately became Wisconsin.
81. State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 361 (quoting Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis.
327, 349–50, 133 N.W. 209, 216 (1911)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 699–700.
84. 92 Wis. 63, 65 N.W. 738 (1896).
85. Id. at 71.
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versus not-legislative power.86 The court gave little attention to the language
of the Wisconsin constitution, and none to its history. Similarly, in In re Village
of North Milwaukee,87 the court resolved a challenge to a statutory scheme
relating to the formation of new villages by surveying a wide range of opinions
from courts in other states.
The court’s opinion in In re Revisor,88 foreshadows the court’s modern
framework. The case concerned the constitutionality of a statute vesting the
court with responsibilities relating to the management of the state library and
the power to appoint a revisor of statutes, both of which the court upheld. In
doing so it noted “that between these several powers, which seem so distinct in
their general character, there are great border lands of power which may be said
to approach nearer and nearer until they merge gradually into each other.”89
More than that, it recognized the “wonderful and increasingly important place
in our governmental scheme” of the “new and remarkable governmental agency
known as the ‘Commission.’”90 “Though not named in the Constitutions, and
not dreamed of by their makers,”91 the court continued, these agencies:
[A]re daily doing many things which vitally affect the life,
liberty, and happiness of the people, and in doing these acts
they are exercising powers trenching closely on the judicial and
the legislative. . . . This does not mean that the distinction
between legislative, executive, and judicial functions has
passed away, or that the constitutional division of powers is
worn out, but simply that as a matter of fact it is impossible to
say at any given place—here is a line where legislative power
ends and judicial power begins—all on one side of this line is
legislative and all on the other side is judicial, and no single
power can be both. Each department has exclusive functions
which no other department can perform, but this does not mean
that there may not be functions common to all the
departments.92
86. Id. at 74.
87. 93 Wis. 616, 67 N.W. 1033 (1896).
88. 141 Wis. 592, 124 N.W. 670 (1910).
89. Id. at 597.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 597–98. These trends manifested themselves more fully in State ex rel. Wis. Inspection
Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N.W. 929 (1928), in which the court openly engaged in “a reexamination of the decisions of this court relating to the delegation of legislative power so-called and
to a study of the development of administrative law, not only in this state, but in other jurisdictions.”
Id. at 936.
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Modern Wisconsin separation of powers caselaw consistently reflects this
insight via the invocation of a distinction between the “core” and “shared”
powers. Core powers are those assigned to a single branch, and they may not
be delegated to or encroached upon by another branch. Shared powers may be
exercised by different branches so long as doing so does not unduly interfere
with another branch’s exercise of its powers. A representative formulation of
the distinction, provided by Justice Brian Hagedorn in Service Employees
International Union v. Vos,93 provides as follows:
A separation-of-powers analysis ordinarily begins by
determining if the power in question is core or shared. Core
powers are understood to be the powers conferred to a single
branch by the constitution. If a power is core, “no other branch
may take it up and use it as its own.” Shared powers are those
that “lie at the interaction of these exclusive core constitutional
powers.” “The branches may exercise powers within these
borderlands but no branch may unduly burden or substantially
interfere with another branch.”94
As a descriptive matter this framework holds obvious appeal. It makes intuitive
sense that some powers belong entirely to one branch or another. The phrase
“separation of powers” implies as much. It also makes sense that there cannot
be complete separation. It’s both conceptually and practically impossible to
completely separate powers, at least within a set of institutional arrangements
that are designed to function.
The problem is that the framework answers no questions about what sorts
of things fall into the respective boxes and thus fails to provide the tools
necessary to resolve any concrete dispute. Determining whether something is
a “core” or “shared” power requires resort to some additional set of criteria—
what Aziz Huq refers to as “separation of powers metatheory.”95 Huq has
identified three general scholarly accounts of separation of powers.96 Though
his concern is with separation of powers at the federal level, his analysis, being
metatheoretical, can also illuminate practice at the state level. Analogous forms

93. 2020 WI 67, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.
94. Id. ¶ 35 (citations omitted).
95. Aziz Z. Huq, Separation of Powers Metatheory, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1517 (2018).
96. Id. Notwithstanding the strikingly confident assertions to the contrary in some recent
opinions, the more accurate view seems to be that “[t]he principles underlying American separatedpowers doctrine remain murky, to put it charitably. A massive body of scholarship on the topic is
riddled with disagreement, uncertainty, and conjecture.” Rogan Kersh, Suzanne B. Mettler, Grant D.
Reeher & Jeffrey M. Stonecash, “More a Distinction of Words than Things”: The Evolution of
Separated Powers in the American States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 5, 9–10 (1998). This is true,
they contend, with respect to both the origins and purposes of separation of powers. Id. at 10–14.
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of each of Huq’s models have at different times appeared in the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s opinions.
Huq labels his first category “separation models,” which “understand each
branch of government as a distinctive and stand-alone entity wielding a defined,
delimited set of powers.”97 Under this sort of model the critical inquiry is
definitional. The working understanding is that, for example, the judicial
branch is the proper home for the judicial power, and that “the judicial power”
refers to some fixed category of powers. There are at least two potential ways
in which this definitional question might be answered. One would entail some
version of originalism, pursuant to which, to continue the example, the inquiry
would involve determining what those who framed or ratified the constitution
intended or understood “the judicial power” to mean. The other would resort
to some general, idealized notion of “the judicial power,” the contours of which
could conceivably shift over time.98
Huq’s second set of models, which he calls “balance models,” are:
[P]remised on a rejection of the possibility of deriving from
either the Constitution’s text or history a delimited and
determinate set of powers for assignment to each branch. . . .
Rather than starting with semantics, the proponents of balance
models focus on the general purposes of the Constitution’s
design.99
It remains necessary under such an approach to begin with some notion of what
the range and attributes of the required balance are, in other words some criteria
by which to assess whether a given arrangement has strayed from what is
constitutionally permissible.
Beyond that, the inquiry is thoroughly
functionalist, with the idea being, roughly speaking, to determine whether
things have become unbalanced.
The third type of account Huq identifies is “exogenous models,” which
“renounce the task of allocating powers to distinct branches and shrug off the
task of finding ways to maintain balance across the federal government.
Instead, they locate benchmarks for constitutional evaluation beyond the
document.”100 Rather than asking whether a specific power is being exercised
by the appropriate branch according to some definitional formula, or whether

97. Huq, supra note 95, at 1527.
98. The alternatives are not mutually exclusive. An originalist analysis might lead to the
conclusion that the framers understood “the judicial power” at a high enough level of generality that
the fixed concept would generate shifting applications in response to the changing nature of the world
to which the concept is applied.
99. Huq, supra note 95, at 1530–31.
100. Id. at 1535.
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its exercise upsets an equilibrium, the question is how well the arrangement
furthers some other value that separation of powers is designed to foster.101 The
separation of powers exists as a design feature because it’s thought to serve
certain functional ends—efficiency in some respects, inefficiency in others, and
certainly the preservation of liberty102—and an exogeneous model might
elevate one of those ends above the others. One often encounters, for example,
elevated language about the role of separation of powers plays in the protection
of liberty.103 An exogeneous approach centered on liberty might result in
separation of powers doctrine being employed in a manner that would make it
the functional equivalent of an unenumerated rights provision. Conceivably, in
other words, a court committed to such an approach could strike down an
arrangement that does not involve the exercise of power by an inappropriate
branch and also does not run afoul of balance norms but that does involve some
departure from the preexisting arrangement that the court finds too threatening
to liberty (even as it also does not run afoul of any enumerated or otherwise
developed constitutional right). On this view, separation of powers would
operate in a manner analogous to the Lochner-era Tenth Amendment, decreeing
some otherwise proper exercises of governmental power off limits based on the
court’s application of the exogeneous criteria.
Although the distinction between core and shared powers leaves room for,
and perhaps even requires, a certain amount of formalism,104 until recently it
was easy to place the Wisconsin approach in the balance model camp. In an
opinion frequently cited by the state supreme court, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals in J.F. Ahern Co. v. Wisconsin State Building Commission105
summarized Wisconsin’s “pragmatic approach” to separation of power:
“Wisconsin’s constitution contains no express separation of powers provision.

101. Here, too, there must be some method, whether a variety of originalism or something else,
by which to identify the exogeneous value and its contours.
102. Of course, concepts such as “liberty” and “tyranny” are hardly self-defining. See infra text
accompanying note 352.
103. E.g., Tetra Tech EC v. Wis. Dep’t of Rev., 2018 WI 75, ¶¶ 45–54, 58–61, 382 Wis. 2d 496,
914 N.W.2d 21.
104. Jonathan Zasloff has characterized the California Supreme Court’s core function doctrine
as a hybrid of formalist and functionalist approaches: “functionalist in that it recognizes that it is
impossible to hermetically seal one branch from another,” but formalist because it “requires courts to
distinguish between legislative, executive, and judicial actions; judges cannot determine whether one
branch has intruded upon the core function of another unless they know what that core function is.”
Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California’s Separation of Powers, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 1079, 1087 (2004).
105. 114 Wis. 2d 69, 336 N.W.2d 679 (1983).

OLDFATHER_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

WISCONSIN SEPARATION OF POWERS

867

The doctrine, as developed by our supreme court, has been liberally applied.”106
“The concern is with actual and substantial encroachments by one branch into
the province of another, not theoretical divisions of power.”107
One of the canonical separation of powers decisions of the past half-century
is Martinez v. Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations,108 in which
the court considered the constitutionality of a statute giving the state
legislature’s Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules (JCRAR) the
ability “to temporarily suspend administrative rules pending bicameral review
by the legislature and presentment to the governor for veto or other action.”109
The specific challenge was to a rule that allowed employers to pay less than
minimum wage to, among others, migrant workers,110 which the JCRAR voted
to suspend. The Department notified employers that they could ignore the
JCRAR’s action, and a group of migrant workers filed suit. The Department’s
arguments were that the statute providing for JCRAR suspension of rules was
unconstitutional because it violated the bicameralism and presentment
requirements111 and that it offended the notion of separation of powers more
generally.
The court opened its analysis by invoking its standard framework for the
review of legislation, under which constitutionality is to be strongly

106. Id. at 101. One of the arguments in Ahern was that the Building Commission violated
separation of powers by vesting executive authority in a commission controlled by members of the
legislature. In most states, such an arrangement would not be permitted. See WILLIAMS, supra note
76, at 242–43 (“The weight of authority, both under federal and states’ separation of powers doctrines,
is that legislators and legislative appointees may not serve on executive or administrative boards and
commissions.”).
107. Ahern, 114 Wis. 2d at 104.
108. 165 Wis. 2d 687, 478 N.W.2d 582 (1992).
109. Id. at 691.
110. Id. at 692.
111. The basic contours of this argument run as follows: The state constitution provides that “No
law shall be enacted except by bill.” WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 17(2). It further provides that “Every bill
which shall have passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor.”
WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10(1)(a). The governor may then sign the bill or veto it in whole or, in the case
of an appropriation bill, in part. WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10(2). It’s almost certainly true that the
legislative power vested in the senate and assembly in Art. IV, § 1 involves a broader category of power
than that of enacting laws as contemplated by Art. IV, § 17. Not only are there other powers specified
in Art. IV, such as those relating to rules, contempts, and expulsions in § 8, but it also seems reasonable
to conclude that the legislature enjoys incidental and implied powers, such as those necessary to gather
information as a predicate to the lawmaking process. Even so, one could credibly argue that the
JCRAR’s suspension of a rule ought to be regarded as lawmaking, and that it therefore is
unconstitutional when performed absent the formalities of bicameralism and presentment.
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presumed.112 It then proceeded to articulate a doctrine of separation of powers
that falls squarely within Huq’s “balance model” category:
This state’s separation of powers doctrine is implicitly created
by the constitution. Wisconsin courts interpret the Wisconsin
Constitution as requiring shared and merged powers of the
branches of government rather than an absolute, rigid and
segregated political design. In State v. Washington the court
stated that “it is neither possible nor practicable to categorize
all governmental action as exclusively legislative, executive or
judicial.” In fact, the doctrine “must be viewed as a general
principle to be applied to maintain the balance between the
three branches of government, to preserve their respective
independence and integrity, and to prevent concentration of
unchecked power in the hands of any one branch.” Thus, the
separation of powers doctrine allows the sharing of powers and
is not inherently violated in instances when one branch
exercises powers normally associated with another branch.113
The court acknowledged the existence of powers that belong exclusively to
each branch but concluded that no such power was implicated in the case. In
doing so it offered only the following, thin justification: “the legislative branch
and the executive branch share inherent interests in the legislative creation and
oversight of administrative agencies.”114 In other words, the court reasoned
from a premise about the delegation of legislative power to an administrative
agency to a conclusion about the delegation of legislative power to a legislative
committee.115
112. The court is inconsistent in its invocation of the presumption of constitutionality in
separation-of-powers cases. It also did so in State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982),
in which it considered the constitutionality of a statute giving defendants an automatic, peremptory
right to request the substitution of a judge. Id. at 40. Even assuming such a deferential posture to the
legislature is generally appropriate, it’s not so clear that it ought to hold in cases where the challenge
concerns what might be regarded, from a separation of powers perspective, as legislative self-dealing.
In other words, it’s one thing to employ a presumption of constitutionality in the context of a rightsbased challenge, or to a statute regulating judicial procedure, but arguably something else entirely to
do so when the challenged law has the effect of shifting the balance of governmental powers toward
the legislative branch. The court’s opinions, unfortunately, leave these questions unrecognized and
unaddressed.
113. Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 696 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 697.
115. There certainly is a case to be made that the grant of authority to the JCRAR ought to be
treated as an intrabranch delegation of the legislative power to a subset of the legislature, and it may
be that the court meant to imply as much. Indeed, the court’s description of its holding—“that
JCRAR’s suspension power is delegated to it pursuant to legitimate legislative standards, and,
furthermore, sufficient procedural safeguards are available to prevent unauthorized decisions by the
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Having set the problem up in that way, the court had no difficulty
concluding that the temporary suspension mechanism was constitutional,
though its reasoning was something of a mishmash. It opened by noting that
administrative agencies have only such powers as the legislature gives them,
and that the delegation of legislative power to an agency is acceptable “as long
as adequate standards for conducting the allocated power are in place.”116 In a
curious nonsequitur, the court then proceeded to identify the statutory grounds
based on which the JCRAR can suspend a rule, concluding that they “set forth
adequate standards for JCRAR to follow when exercising its powers.”117
The court then turned its attention back to the agency, noting that its powers,
including rulemaking powers, can be revoked by the legislature.118 Without
bothering to bridge the gap between this premise and what follows—without,
in other words, pausing to puzzle over the fact that the power to create does not
always entail the power to meddle119—the court offered its conclusion: “It is
appropriate for the legislature to delegate rule-making authority to an agency
while retaining the right to review any rules promulgated under the delegated
power.”120
The court likewise rejected the bicameralism and presentment challenges,
noting that “an administrative rule is not legislation as such” and that any
change in law that followed a temporary suspension of a rule would have to be
the product of the full lawmaking procedures.121 Stated differently, the
arrangement “furthers bicameral passage, presentment and separation of
powers principles by imposing mandatory checks and balances on any
temporary rule suspension.”122
committee”—echoes the test applicable to legislative delegations to agencies. Id. at 702. But the case
for treating those two types of delegation as equivalent is hardly clear and must account for the
constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements, which arguably compel the conclusion that
when the legislature exercises the legislative power it must do so in the constitutionally compelled
way, or at least that intrabranch delegations should be assessed under different standards than
interbranch delegations. Certainly, as discussed below, any effort to institute a robust nondelegation
doctrine in Wisconsin would seem to have necessarily implications for the legislature’s ability to
delegate important parts of its work to committees.
116. Id. at 697.
117. Id. at 698.
118. Id. at 697–98.
119. It does not necessarily follow that the power to create implies the power to do so subject to
any and all conditions. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding
that even though the creation of a property interest for procedural due process purposes is a question
of state law, it does not follow that a state has the ability to define a property right in such a way that
no procedures are required for its deprivation).
120. Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 698.
121. Id. at 699.
122. Id.
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However imprecise it might be, the court’s analysis is thoroughly
functionalist, unconcerned with formalistic definitional concerns, and focused
on the balance of power, all of which is most fully on display in the following
paragraph from near the end of the opinion:
As a matter of public policy, it is incumbent on the legislature,
pursuant to its constitutional grant of legislative power, to
maintain some legislative accountability over rule-making.
Such legislative responsibility adheres to the fundamental
political principle and design of our democracy which makes
elected officials accountable for rules governing the public
welfare. Section 227.26, Stats., is carefully designed so that
people of this state, through their elected representatives, will
continue to exercise a significant check on the activities of nonelected agency bureaucrats. Furthermore, the rule suspension
process provides a legislative check on agency action which
prevents potential agency over-reaching.123
As we will see, in some of its recent cases the court has taken a more formalistic
approach to separation-of-powers issues. This presents a danger—the selective
invocation of formalist against the backdrop of a thoroughly functionalist
jurisprudence can result in a balance of power that looks very different from what
likely would have resulted had formalism been the approach all along.

III. RECENT CASES
Over the past two decades the Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided a
number of high-profile cases concerning the separation of powers. This part
contains a non-comprehensive survey of those cases. The goal is both to
summarize and critique the opinions in light of the court’s broader
jurisprudence, as well as to identify themes and concerns to be addressed later
in the analysis.
A. Kalal
The underlying issue in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County
involved a lawyer’s efforts to recover money that she claimed her employer had
stolen rather than depositing in her retirement account.124 Because the district
attorney had not pursued the matter, she resorted to a statutory provision that
empowers circuit judges to authorize the filing of complaints in situations in
which the court determines there is probable cause and “a district attorney
refuses or is unavailable to issue a complaint.”125
123. Id. at 701.
124. 2004 WI 58, ¶ 3, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.
125. WIS. STAT. § 968.02(3) (2019–20).
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Kalal presented two separation of powers issues. One was whether it is
constitutionally problematic to empower a court to arguably override an
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.126 The second, triggered by the need to
determine what it means for a district attorney to “refuse” to issue a complaint,
concerned the court’s approach to statutory interpretation, a task that inevitably
concerns the division of labor between legislatures and courts.127
The court resolved the first of these issues via what can plausibly be
characterized as a loose originalism. It did not invoke the Busé v. Smith
framework and did not engage in any deep historical consideration of prevailing
practices or understandings at any of the potentially relevant points in
Wisconsin constitutional history. Nor did it invoke its traditional distinction
between core and shared powers. But it did engage in enough historical
analysis to conclude that, because magistrates held the sole authority to issue
criminal complaints prior to 1945,128 the power has traditionally been shared,
such that the statutory arrangement did not provide grounds for a direct
separation of powers challenge.129 The case thus stands as an example of the
general proposition that a substantial departure from prior practice—which a
switch from a criminal process initiated by magistrates to one initiated by
district attorneys surely is—is not itself problematic from a separation-ofpowers perspective even when it results in a significant shift of power from one
branch to another.
In approaching the second issue, the court’s methodology has considerably
more of a common-law feel. The discussion opens by quoting a paragraph from
the court’s 1976 decision in Student Association v. Baum130 outlining “two
accepted methods for interpretation of statutes,” then draws upon secondary
sources and a few of the court’s more recent opinions on the way to concluding
that the court’s approach to statutory interpretation has generated “some
analytical confusion.”131 It accordingly felt the need to provide clarification of
“the general framework for statutory interpretation.”132 As a prelude to doing
so, the court, in a paragraph free of citation to authority, offered the following
general characterization of the division of labor between the legislature and the
judiciary:
It is, of course, a solemn obligation of the judiciary to faithfully
give effect to the laws enacted by the legislature, and to do so
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 27, 30.
Id. ¶¶ 37–38, 44.
Id. ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 35.
74 Wis. 2d 283, 294, 246 N.W.2d 622, 626 (1976); Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 38.
Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 38, 43.
Id. ¶ 44.
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requires a determination of statutory meaning. Judicial
deference to the policy choices enacted into law by the
legislature requires that statutory interpretation focus primarily
on the language of the statute. We assume that the legislature’s
intent is expressed in the statutory language. Extrinsic
evidence of legislative intent may become relevant to statutory
interpretation in some circumstances, but is not the primary
focus of inquiry. It is the enacted law, not the unenacted intent,
that is binding on the public. Therefore, the purpose of
statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute means
so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect.133
The court’s language in this paragraph reveals a tension that the opinion
acknowledges but does not completely resolve. The court both places the intent
behind statutory language at the center of the inquiry—the goal is to further the
legislature’s policy choices, and to give the statute its “intended effect”—but
yet the court restricts itself from consideration of a category of evidence bearing
on that intent. The best evidence of intent, the court tells us, is the language the
legislature used. That’s no doubt correct, but to say that something is the best
evidence is not to say that it should be the only evidence.
If indeed the ultimate goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to
something that might plausibly be characterized as the legislature’s intent,134
and if it is also, as we will soon see the court repeatedly proclaiming, the duty
of the courts to say what the law is,135 then this regime is somewhat puzzling.
Its effect is to cut the court off from consideration of a specific category of
information that surely is, in the evidentiary sense, both relevant and often
probative with respect to the ultimate question. The concerns, only briefly
alluded to in the majority opinion, include “a mistrust of legislative history
[and] cynicism about the capacity of the legislative or judicial processes to be
manipulated.”136 The idea is often expressed in a line attributed to Judge Harold
Leventhal to the effect that being allowed to cite legislative history is like
“looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.”137 That logic is both

133. Id.
134. Whether it’s appropriate to regard a legislature or other group as having a single, collective
intent is another matter. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 702–03 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (The other Justices “assume[] that individual legislators are motivated by
one discernible ‘actual’ purpose, and ignore[] the fact that different legislators may vote for a single
piece of legislation for widely different reasons.”).
135. See infra Section II.
136. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 52.
137. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983).
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questionable138 and, as we will see, in some tension with some justices’
freewheeling use of sources in discerning the meaning of the state
constitution.139 Various opinions since Kalal invoke this suggestion that its rule
serves primarily as a pragmatic restraint on judges, motivated by a concern that
legislative history is somehow uniquely amenable to use in result-oriented
judging.140 The justices are generally free to ground their reasoning in whatever
sources they conclude cast light on the resolution of a problem, whether it’s the
court’s own past cases, opinions from other jurisdictions, individual writings
by judges or academics, or, were a judge to deem them appropriate sources of
guidance, restaurant placemats. What they cannot do is refer to legislative
history.
The opinion in Kalal also hints at an alternative justification. At the
conclusion of its consideration of the appropriateness of looking beyond the
statutory language, the court adds a different claim, relying this time on a book
published by the late Justice Antonin Scalia: The legislature passed a set of
words, no more and no less, and those words, and not some intention distinct
from the words, are the law.141 The logic here is different, and is focused less
on constraining the judicial power and more on capturing the nature of
legislative power, which it envisions as limited to the enactment of texts in
some fairly narrow sense. Whatever the legislature, or any given subset of
legislators, may have thought they were doing, what they voted on was a
collection of words.142 This claim raises deep questions about the nature of the
judicial and legislative powers, and the two lines of justifications would seem
to have different implications in terms of, to put it in familiar evidentiary terms,

138. See Adam M. Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd—Do More Interpretive Sources Mean More
Discretion?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 558 (2017) (“Logically and statistically, the power to make friends
in a crowd by spinning sources overwhelms the importance of crowd size—and, crucially, the power
to pick friends can generate plenty of discretion even in small crowds.”).
139. See infra Section II.
140. See, e.g., Clean Wis., Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 2021 WI 71, ¶¶ 84–92, 398 Wis. 2d
433, 961 N.W.2d 346 (Rebecca Bradley, J., dissenting) (drawing on a nonrepresentative sample of
secondary sources to support the claim that a specific brand of textualism is the only legitimate way to
interpret statutes and suggesting that resort to legislative history is uniquely conducive to judicial
result-orientation).
141. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 52 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17
(1997)).
142. This conception of the legislative power raises interesting questions. If it is appropriate to
consider the text because that is the only thing that “the legislature” passed, and it is not appropriate to
consider pieces of legislative history like committee reports because those are not things that “the
legislature” passed, then one might wonder how it is otherwise appropriate for the legislature to
empower committees to engage in legally consequential conduct—whether it be the review of
administrative rules or the withholding of consent to the settlement of litigation.
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the relevance, probative value, and potential prejudicial effect of legislative
history, but the court does not explore them.143
Kalal matters for purposes of this Article not only because the issue it
addresses relates in a fundamental way to the separation of powers, but also
because the court’s subsequent use of its test is instructive. That test—roughly,
that it is appropriate to consider “extrinsic” information beyond the statutory
text, such as legislative history, only when the text is ambiguous144—is one that
the court has more or less consistently applied since. But there are exceptions.
For example, in State v. Luedtke,145 the court interpreted a statute criminalizing
the operation of a motor vehicle with a controlled substance in one’s blood in
order to determine whether it created a strict liability offense. In doing so it
relied on a six-factor test from State v. Jadowski,146 a case decided shortly after
Kalal, that expressly calls for the consideration of legislative history and other
policy-infused factors that go well beyond text. Although both were statutory
interpretation cases, neither even mentioned Kalal or any sort of similar
framework.147 More recently, in Wisconsin Legislature v. Evers,148 it was
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, in dissent, rather than the majority, who relied on
Kalal’s framework.

143. There is a deep literature on statutory interpretation that engages with these issues (and
more) that I will here only generally acknowledge. My point is not to resolve any of these questions,
but instead simply to note that a court adopting a methodological framework like that in Kalal is
traversing deep waters, and the premises on which it does so, whether they are explicit or implicit, will
typically have implications that extend beyond the narrow question the court is addressing.
144. The court also allowed that “legislative history is sometimes consulted to confirm or verify
a plain-meaning interpretation,” id. ¶ 51, and indeed itself cited legislative history in its analysis, id.
¶ 56. Notably, the court does not say what should happen if the consultation of legislative history to
confirm the plain meaning did not actually confirm it. And, of course, the process would never in
reality proceed in that way, because a court would almost certainly have been exposed to legislative
history as part of the parties’ arguments before it had reached any conclusions about the plain meaning
of the statutory text. The result seems to be a rule that allows for the use of legislative history to bolster
a text-based conclusion (thereby confirming that legislative history can be relevant and probative) but
not to undercut or qualify one.
145. 2015 WI 42, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592; See also United States v. Franklin, 2019 WI
64, ¶¶ 24–31, 387 Wis. 2d 259, 928 N.W.2d 545 (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (noting a similar tension
between Kalal and an interpretive test that, to that point, had expressly called for resort to legislative
history).
146. 2004 WI 68, ¶ 21 n. 15, 272 Wis. 2d 418, 680 N.W.2d 810.
147. This is not to suggest that the cases are necessarily inconsistent. A sensible explanation
would be to say that because strict liability offenses are disfavored, any statute without an express mens
rea element is inherently ambiguous, such that resort to extrinsic evidence is permissible under Kalal.
But neither opinion does so.
148. No.
2020AP608-OA
(Wis.
Apr.
6,
2020)
(per
curiam),
https://www.wicourts.gov/news/docs/2020AP608_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV7Y-JWR4].
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B. Ferdon/Mayo
A pair of recent cases concerned whether, and to what extent, the court
should presume the constitutionality of a statute. The strength and nature of
such a presumption has an obvious separation-of-powers dimension. Deference
to the legislature’s judgment about the constitutionality of its own conduct
places more power in the legislature’s hands than would be the case in a regime
without such deference.
In Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,149 the court
considered the constitutionality of legislation placing a cap on noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice claims. Speaking through then-Chief Justice
Abrahamson, the majority concluded that the cap violated the equal protection
guarantee in the state constitution by affording differential treatment to those
claimants whose noneconomic damages were under the cap (and who thus
would be fully compensated) and those whose damages were above the cap
(who would receive only partial compensation for their noneconomic loss). At
the outset of its analysis the court invoked its familiar framework for review—
it would apply rational basis scrutiny and would strike the statute down only
upon concluding that it was unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.150
After elaborating on the standard for several paragraphs, and reiterating the
deference due to the legislature’s policy choices, the court confirmed that a role
remained for it, and that it was not simply a rubber stamp:
[J]udicial deference to the legislature and the presumption of
constitutionality of statutes do not require a court to acquiesce
in the constitutionality of every statute. A court need not, and
should not, blindly accept the claims of the legislature. For
judicial review under rational basis to have any meaning, there
must be a meaningful level of scrutiny, a thoughtful
examination of not only the legislative purpose, but also the
relationship between the legislation and the purpose. The court
must “probe beneath the claims of the government to determine
if the constitutional ‘requirement of some rationality in the
nature of the class singled out’ has been met.”151
Rather than characterizing its analysis as simply involving the application
of rational basis review, however, the court then proceeded to discuss the notion
of “rational basis with teeth.”152 This was a curious and probably unnecessary
rhetorical choice, because the court could certainly have invoked past cases

149.
150.
151.
152.

2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.
Id. ¶¶ 67–68.
Id. ¶ 77.
Id. ¶ 78.
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from Wisconsin and elsewhere in support of the idea that rational basis review
is meaningful review.153 Moreover, the idea was only partially developed, and
was not connected in any specific way to Wisconsin constitutional history or
tradition, which contributes to the impression that the discussion was tacked on
simply to justify the result in the case. Nor did the court make it clear whether
it regarded itself as departing from past practice by invoking this approach,
whether “called rational basis, rational basis with teeth, or meaningful rational
basis,”154 versus simply confirming a pre-existing understanding that,
deferential though it might be, the court does have a meaningful role to play in
the review of legislation.
The majority’s rhetorical clumsiness did not go unnoticed. Former justice
(and current federal judge) Diane Sykes, delivering the annual Hallows Lecture
at Marquette University Law School, focused her attention on five cases from
the court’s 2004–2005 term.155 Collectively, in her estimation:
[T]hese five cases mark a dramatic shift in the court’s
jurisprudence, departing from some familiar and longaccepted principles that normally operate as constraints on the
court’s use of its power: the presumption that statutes are
constitutional, judicial deference to legislative policy choices,
respect for precedent and authoritative sources of legal
interpretation, and the prudential institutional caution that
counsels against imposing broad-brush judicial solutions to
difficult social problems.156
Ferdon was among the five cases, and on Judge Sykes’s reading it “redefines
the [rational basis] standard upward so that it effectively functions as a
heightened or intermediate level of scrutiny”157 with the apparent goal being “to
authorize the court to make a policy-laden value judgment about the tendency
of a statute to effectively achieve its objectives, and invalidate the statute if the
court believes that tendency to be insufficient to justify the statutory
classification.”158 The result, in her estimation, was “a major departure from

153. In City of Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 Wis. 288, 300, 46 N.W. 128, 132 (1890), the court
struck down a statute prohibiting the driving of piles into the Rock River in Rock County. The case
seems to be a bit of an outlier, and the court’s reasoning has a very Lochner-era feel to it, with none of
the solicitousness toward the legislature’s judgments of constitutionality that the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard typically signifies. See also, Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 577–82 (Ill. 1995).
154. Ferdon, 2005 WI 125, ¶ 80.
155. Diane S. Sykes, Reflections on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, MARQ. LAW. 52, 54 (2006).
156. Id. at 54.
157. Id. at 55.
158. Id. at 56.
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long-accepted constitutional principles that operate to maintain the balance of
power between the legislative and judicial branches.”159
Ferdon was not long-lived. In the 2018 case of Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured
Patients and Families Compensation Fund,160 the court, in an opinion written
by Chief Justice Patience Roggensack (who dissented in Ferdon), expressly
overruled Ferdon.161 The problem with Ferdon, the opinion asserted (more or
less as fiat; the opinion does little to explain why its assertions are the correct
ones162), was that it ran contrary to the “respect for a co-equal branch of
government and its legislative acts” embodied in the deeply deferential beyonda-reasonable-doubt standard to be applied to constitutional challenges,
substituting instead “the [court] majority’s policy choice for Wisconsin.”163
The Mayo opinion likewise involves some curious choices. For one, it does
not invoke the framework the court has elsewhere used in assessing whether to
overrule a past decision.164 Nor does it ground its conclusions in the long
history of deference to the legislature that characterizes Wisconsin

159. Id.
160. 2018 WI 78, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678.
161. Id. ¶ 32.
162. Cf. Patience Drake Roggensack, Elected to Decide: Is the Decision-Avoidance Doctrine of
Great Weight Deference Appropriate in this Court of Last Resort?, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 541, 545 (2006)
(critiquing the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s “decision-avoidance doctrines” as “formalistic approaches
to decision making that have been developed without persuasively explaining why their use in each
case where they are employed better serves the public interest than does a well-reasoned opinion that
describes how the application of the law to the facts of the case or the interpretation of a statute causes
the result reached”).
163. Mayo, 2018 WI 78, ¶¶ 25–31. In overruling Ferdon, the court did not limit itself to the
notion of rational basis with teeth:
Ferdon also creates new doctrine when it holds that “[a] statute may be
constitutionally valid when enacted but may become constitutionally invalid
because of changes in the conditions to which the statute applies. A past crisis
does not forever render a law valid.” There is no law to support this extraordinary
declaration and we overrule it as well as “rational basis with teeth.”
Id. ¶ 32 (citations omitted). The claim that there is “no law” to support the idea that changed
circumstances is incorrect. The idea may well seem suspect, and contrary to a regime of judicial
deference to legislative policy choices, but it is also at the heart of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
164. Justice Roggensack has herself authored a lengthy discussion of that framework. Bartlett
v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶¶ 65–89, 393 Wis. 2d 172, 945 N.W.2d 685 (Roggensack, C.J., concurring).
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constitutional law.165 As early as 1853, in Dickson v. State,166 the court
observed, “It is a delicate matter to set aside or declare void, a solemn enactment
of an independent and co-ordinate branch of the government, and the courts
will never do so unless such enactment is clearly in violation of the fundamental
law of the land.”167 The specific “beyond a reasonable doubt” formulation had
taken shape in Wisconsin by 1906,168 and it was presented as generally true of
state constitutional law in Cooley’s 1868 treatise.169 Still, the Wisconsin

165. Although that deference is hardly universal. Consider, for example, Milwaukee J. Sentinel
v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 2009 WI 79, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700, in which the court confronted
a pair of certified questions relating to whether the legislature in ratifying a collective bargaining
agreement could be viewed as having amended the Public Records Law. The court concluded that the
answer was no, and in setting forth its standard of review made no reference to any sort of deference
to the legislature’s presumed assessment of its constitutional power to act. Id. ¶ 14. Later the court
observed that, “While we are conscious of the substantial deference we owe to the other independent
branches of government in the exercise of their constitutional responsibilities, we are also conscious
of our own responsibility to determine whether the provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution have been
followed.” Id. ¶ 33. This language, and the analysis that accompanies it, is a far cry from the “beyond
a reasonable doubt” standard the court typically applies. It is, of course, possible that the court had
some sort of distinction in mind with respect to cases in which the question bears on whether the
legislature followed the constitutionally prescribed procedures, but the court does not say.
The opinion is potentially notable for another reason. In analyzing whether the pertinent article
in the collective bargaining agreement should be regarded as law, the court opened by observing that
“an act of the legislature that is not authorized by the constitution is not a law.” Id. ¶ 21. That in turn
requires that, in order for something to be a “law,” it must “be enacted by bill” as required by Article
IV, Section 17(2) of the state constitution. Id. ¶ 22. The legislature did enact a general bill (which the
governor signed) pursuant to which it ratified the agreement, but the court concluded that this was
inadequate at least in part because the bill “contain[ed] no language which might put the citizens of
Wisconsin on notice that the Public Records Law is being amended.” Id. ¶ 24. The underlying logic
is difficult to discern. The basic idea seems to be that there is some baseline notice requirement
embedded in the notion of the word “bill,” but the court makes no effort to support that conclusion.
Nor is there any sort of effort to discern more generally the purposes served by the bill requirement
and then to engage in some sort of functionalist analysis based on that. The premises driving the
reasoning are left unarticulated, and the implications of and for Wisconsin law more generally (such
as, for example, for principle-of-legality doctrines in the criminal law) are unexplored. One bottomline implication seems to be that the only way the legislature can exercise the legislative power is
through the enactment of bills, which, pursued to its logical end, would seem to compel the conclusion
that at least some of the work that the legislature currently does through committees is unconstitutional.
166. 1 Wis. 122 (1853).
167. Id. at 126.
168. Nash v. Fries, 129 Wis. 120, 108 N.W. 210, 211 (1906) (“It is, of course, the duty of courts
to presume an intention on the part of the Legislature to act constitutionally, and, as between two
constructions of a statute, one of which would be within the legislative power and the other forbidden
to it, to adopt the former if at all reasonable. It is only when the unconstitutional purpose is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that a court can be justified in declaring void an act of the Legislature.”).
169. COOLEY, supra note 51.
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Supreme Court has been something of an outlier in continuing to employ it as
aggressively as it has.170 In a concurring opinion, Justice Rebecca Bradley
expressed her concern that the court’s highly deferential posture toward the
legislature’s constitutional judgments “seems incompatible with our duty of
ensuring the legislature does not exceed its constitutional powers” and “is an
abdication of our core judicial powers.”171 Though the case indeed presented a
good opportunity for the court to clarify the nature and scope of its review, the
court provided little of substance apart from the conclusion that it rejected the
notion of a more aggressive form of rational basis review.
By focusing its analysis on the deferential nature of its review, the court
also neglected to address them in terms of the rights being asserted. The court
implicitly adhered to its traditional lockstep approach, and thereby elected not
to consider whether the distinct nature of state constitutions may also entail a

It has been said by an eminent jurist, that when courts are called upon to
pronounce the invalidity of an act of legislation, passed with all the forms and
ceremonies requisite to give it the force of law, they will approach the question
with great caution, examine it in every possible aspect, and ponder upon it as long
as deliberation and patient attention can throw any new light upon the subject,
and never declare a statute void, unless the nullity and invalidity of the act are
placed, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must be
solved in favor of the legislative action, and the act be sustained.
COOLEY, supra note 51, at 182. Cooley’s formulation is more nuanced than the Wisconsin court’s
typical statement of the rule. He notes, for example, that “[i]f it were understood that legislators
refrained from exercising their judgment, or that, in cases of doubt, they allowed themselves to lean in
favor of the action they desired to accomplish, the foundation for the cases we have cited would be
altogether taken away.” Id. at 183–84. As Christopher Green observes, elected branches of
government often provide little basis for a belief that they take seriously their responsibility to assess
the constitutionality of their actions. Christopher R. Green, Clarity and Reasonable Doubt in Early
State-Constitutional Judicial Review, 57 S. TEX. L. REV. 169, 171 (2015). Green also observes,
“Reasonable-doubt formulations of the presumption of constitutionality do not seem to appear at all in
early non-judicial materials, but they were set out in frequently cited treatises by Theodore Sedgwick
in 1857 and Thomas Cooley in 1868.” Id. at 173. This at least suggests that there is a basis for
concluding that the understanding of the judicial power, and by extension other powers, was different
at the time of the adoption of the Wisconsin constitution than it was when the federal constitution was
adopted, such that reflexive resort to discussion of the federal judicial power as a guide to the nature
of the Wisconsin judicial power is, without further work, inherently suspect even if one accepts
originalism as an appropriate methodology.
170. One commentator found that the Wisconsin Supreme Court is the second-most frequent
user of the standard among all state supreme courts in the period dating from 2000. Hugh Spitzer,
“Unconstitutional Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”—A Misleading Mantra that Should Be Gone for
Good, 96 WASH. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 14 n.86 (2021). Spitzer concludes that in Washington, at least,
the standard is not used to set the high bar its language implies. Id. at 19.
171. Mayo v. Wis Injured Patients & Families Compensation Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶ 69, 383 Wis.
2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678. Her opinion does not cite Cooley and largely draws on authorities relating to
judicial review under the federal constitution.
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distinct approach to rights. As Robert Williams puts it, “State constitutional
rights provisions, by contrast to the federal guarantees we think of as protecting
minority and unpopular people, sometimes actually provide majoritarian
protections.”172 Lochner-style economic substantive due process may thus have
a place in state constitutional adjudication, where it is “more often used to
protect the majority from ‘special-interest’ legislation.”173
C. Gabler
In Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Board,174 the court considered the
constitutionality of a statutory scheme that gave the Crime Victims Rights
Board the power “to investigate and adjudicate complaints against judges, issue
reprimands against judges, and seek equitable relief and forfeitures through
civil actions against judges.”175 This, the court—speaking through Justice
Rebecca Bradley—concluded, was an unconstitutional encroachment on the
judicial branch’s exercise of its core power.176
Following a two-paragraph introduction in which the court framed the
stakes as concerning “the judicial independence that serves as a bulwark
protecting the people against tyranny,” it offered a section entitled “An
Independent Judiciary.”177 The section draws on a range of materials, all of
which relate exclusively to the federal constitution until the section’s final
paragraph, at which point the court asserts that the principles it extracts “inform
our understanding of the separation of powers under the Wisconsin
Constitution.”178
That discussion was almost certainly unnecessary to reaching its
conclusion. The court might instead have extracted all that it needed from In
the Matter of Grady,179 a case in which it struck down a statute requiring circuit
judges to decide matters within a prescribed time frame and calling for the
withholding of a portion of their salaries if they did not do so. The court
reasoned that the statute “constitutes an attempt by the legislature to coerce
judges in their exercise of the essential case-deciding function of the

172. WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 33.
173. Id. Consider, for example, Church v. State, 646 N.E.2d 572, 580 (Ill. 1995), in which the
Illinois Supreme Court struck down a statute that, it concluded, effectively granted existing members
of the private alarm contracting business a monopoly over entry into the field.
174. 2017 WI 67, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384.
175. Id. ¶ 2.
176. Id.
177. Id. at. ¶¶ 2, 3
178. Id. ¶ 11.
179. 118 Wis. 2d 762, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984).
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judiciary”180 and thus “violates the well-established policy that the judicial
branch of government must be independent in the fulfillment of its
constitutional responsibilities.”181
After a second section in which it outlined the case’s factual background,
which centered on Judge Gabler’s decisions regarding the timing of the
sentencing of a criminal defendant, the court turned to the standard of review.
Perhaps not surprisingly, given her expressed concerns in Mayo,182 Justice
Bradley did not invoke the strong presumption that legislation is constitutional,
proceeding instead to the core/shared powers framework.183 And this situation,
the court concluded, was clearly one implicating the core powers of the
judiciary, which “encompasses ‘the ultimate adjudicative authority of courts to
finally decide rights and responsibilities as between individuals.’”184 To allow
the board to review and attach consequences to a judge’s conduct “would
unconstitutionally permit an executive entity to substitute its judgment for that
of the judge—effectively imposing an executive veto over discretionary judicial
decision-making and incentivizing judges to make decisions not in accordance
with the law but in accordance with the demands of the executive branch.”185
The result in Gabler seems clearly correct regardless of the approach one
takes to separation of powers. Subjecting judges to post-adjudication
consequences can easily be characterized as infringement on a core power or
the overburdening of a shared power. As noted above, its conclusion is easily
justifiable in light of past case law. Its potential significance stems from its
methodology, and in particular its incorporation of and reliance on conclusions
most consistent with an exogenous model that privileges the preservation of a
certain conception of liberty above all else. The relationship between judicial
independence and liberty is not divined via an originalist effort to locate the
relevant concepts in materials tying them to 1848, but rather through an
unconstrained sampling of sources relating primarily to the federal
constitution.186 Methodologically, then, it is an outlier. The approach is one

180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 782.
Id.
See 2018 WI 78, ¶¶ 83–95, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678 (R. Bradley, J., concurring).
Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Board, 2017 WI 67, ¶ 30, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d

384.
184. Id. ¶ 37 (quoting State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶ 36, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460).
185. Id. ¶ 36.
186. Id. ¶¶ 3–11. That survey includes a component of functionalist reasoning in that the court
notes that its assessment of judicial independence cannot be undertaken “without paying appropriate
attention to the incentives affecting individual judges.” Id. ¶ 8. Given this focus on incentives,
particularly when coupled with the express reference to life tenure (or, at least, the fact that federal

OLDFATHER_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

882

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:845

that has been largely absent from the court’s reasoning about the Wisconsin
constitution, and that is inconsistent with the Busé framework to which the court
has in recent decades purported to adhere, and in tension (at the very least) with
the court’s traditional use of a balance model in separation-of-powers cases.
D. Tetra Tech
The narrow question before the court in Tetra Tech, Inc. v. Wisconsin
Department of Revenue187 concerned the definitional scope of the word
“processing” in a tax statute.188 But Justice Kelly in his lead opinion also
elected to take up the much broader questions of whether and to what extent the
court should defer to administrative agencies’ interpretations of statutes.189
Prior to Tetra Tech, the court’s approach was one in which it would afford
“great weight deference” to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if the
following four conditions were satisfied:
(1) the agency was charged by the legislature with the duty of
administering the statute; (2) . . . the interpretation of the
agency is one of long-standing; (3) . . . the agency employed
its expertise or specialized knowledge in forming the
interpretation; and (4) . . . the agency’s interpretation will
provide uniformity and consistency in the application of the
statute.190
Then, if the agency’s interpretation was reasonable, the court was compelled to
adopt it even if the court concluded that an alternative interpretation was
better.191
If great weight deference did not apply, “due weight deference” might.192
It applied in situations involving a statute that an agency was responsible for
administering, but where the agency had “not developed the expertise which
necessarily places it in a better position to make judgments regarding the

judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,” id. ¶ 9), it is notable that the court does not
mention the fact that Wisconsin judges are elected. While doing so might be rhetorically counter to
the theme of drawing on the federal model for precise implications about the state judiciary, the
existence of another, fairly substantial, check on the judicial power provides strong support for the
conclusion that the mechanism under consideration goes too far.
187. 2018 WI 75, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21.
188. WIS. STAT. § 77.52(2)(a)11 (2019–20).
189. Tetra Tech, 2018 WI 75, ¶¶ 2, 9–10.
190. Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. LIRC, 196 Wis.2d 650, 539 N.W.2d 98, 102
(1995)).
191. Id.
192. Id. ¶ 13.

OLDFATHER_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

WISCONSIN SEPARATION OF POWERS

883

interpretation of the statute than a court.”193 In that situation a court was free
to depart from the agency’s interpretation if it concluded that a different
interpretation was better or, in the court’s phrasing, “more reasonable.”194 In
what would seem to be the highly unlikely situation in which a court could
conclude that an alternative interpretation was neither more nor less reasonable
than the agency’s, the agency interpretation would prevail.195 If neither of the
above situations applied, then neither did deference. The court would simply
engage in standard de novo review, taking the agency’s interpretation and
reasoning into account but in no sense regarding the fact of that interpretation
itself as any sort of thumb on the scale.
In Justice Kelly’s recounting of the history,196 this was another situation
where the court settled on an interpretive framework through a process that was,
at least when assessed by the content of the court’s opinions, more a product of
happenstance than considered analysis. Its roots, Justice Kelly suggests, are in
the case of Harrington v. Smith,197 which in his recounting used “not the
language of deference, but of persuasion.”198 What followed was a long period

193. UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 286, 548 N.W.2d 57, 62 (1996) (quoted in Tetra Tech,
2018 WI 75, ¶ 15).
194. Tetra Tech, 2018 WI 75, ¶ 15.
195. Id.
196. In recounting this history, Justice Kelly drew heavily on Patience Drake Roggensack,
Elected to Decide: Is the Decision-Avoidance Doctrine of Great Weight Deference Appropriate in this
Court of Last Resort?, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 541 (2006).
197. 28 Wis. 43 (1871).
198. Tetra Tech, 2018 WI 75, ¶ 20. That characterization is not so clearly correct as Justice
Kelly’s opinion suggests. As noted in Tetra Tech, the Harrington court said this: “Long and
uninterrupted practice under a statute, especially by the officers whose duty it was to execute it, is good
evidence of its construction, and such practical construction will be adhered to, even though, were it
res integra, it might be difficult to maintain it.” 28 Wis. at 68 (emphasis added) (quoted in Tetra Tech,
2018 WI 75, ¶ 19). Justice Kelly’s opinion then slides to language appearing two paragraphs later in
the Harrington opinion, where the court was expressly discussing an “important fact” present “in this
case,” namely the presence of the attorney general on the commission charged with giving effect to the
statute. Tetra Tech, 2018 WI 75, ¶ 19. It is in the context of that second discussion, and not the more
general discussion from two paragraphs earlier, that the court uses the language that Justice Kelly relies
on in characterizing Harrington as being about persuasion rather than deference. Id. ¶ 20. To be sure,
Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210, 6 L.Ed 603 (1827), cited in Harrington and
discussed by Justice Kelly, does speak of giving “very great respect” to the interpretation of those
responsible for enforcement of a law, which is not the same as mandatory deference. At the same time,
it also seems to call for something greater than what the Tetra Tech decision ultimately affords to
agency interpretations. The opinion in In re Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, 602–03, 124 N.W. 670, 673 (1910),
contains similar language suggesting more of a history of deference than Justice Kelly allows:
“Lawbreaking is none the less lawbreaking because it is grayheaded with age; but when the meaning
of a doubtful clause is in question, the construction placed upon it by the fathers, and concurred in
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in which the court did not reflexively defer,199 but then began the path toward
deference by importing a federal standard to state review,200 and finally, in
Harnischfeger v. Labor and Industry Review Commission,201 used language
suggesting mandatory deference202 and elevated the deference regime “from a
canon of construction to a standard of review.”203
The doctrine having somewhat haphazardly come together, what remains is
what Justice Kelly disingenuously calls “a matter of first impression,”204 and a
not insignificant one at that: “whether our deference doctrine is compatible with
our constitution’s grant of power to the judiciary.”205 The answer, Justice Kelly
concludes, is that it is not compatible, that the deference doctrines place judicial
power in the executive branch, and that the proper approach is to give agency
interpretations the same analytical weight as an appellate court gives to a trial
court’s reasoning on a question of law—it might be helpful and even
persuasive, but it is in no sense binding.

through long years without question, is strongly persuasive and frequently will be held to be
controlling.” (emphasis added).
In addition, Cooley’s treatise—in which he conceived of state constitutions as subject to the same
interpretive principles as statutes—speaks of a tradition of deference to executive interpretations of
their state’s constitution:
Great deference has been paid in all cases to the action of the executive
department, where its officers have been called upon, under the responsibilities
of their official oaths, to inaugurate a new system, and where it is to be presumed,
they have carefully and conscientiously weighed all considerations, and
endeavored to keep with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. If the
question involved is really one of doubt, the force of their judgment, the force of
their judgment, especially in view of the injurious consequences that may result
from disregarding it, is fairly entitled to turn the scale in the judicial mind.
COOLEY, supra note 51, at 69. Of course, as noted in Part I, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s early
constitutional interpretation, in general, departed from that described by Cooley. But it has in the past
followed this strand of the approach he describes, especially where there is an interpretation of
longstanding. For example, in Bd. of Tr. of Lawrence Univ. v. Outagamie Cnty., 150 Wis. 244, 136
N.W. 619 (1912), the court recognized the principle “that the uninterrupted practice of the government
prevailing through a long series of years and the acquiescence of all its departments settle a
constitutional interpretation in accordance with such long-continued practice.” Id. at 622. See also
State ex rel. Williams v. Samuelson, 131 Wis. 499, 111 N.W. 712 (1907); Schultz v. Milwaukee Cnty.,
245 Wis. 111, 120, 13 N.W.2d 580, 584 (1944) (“The rule of practical construction as applied to
constitutions has been approved many times by this Court.”).
199. Tetra Tech, 2018 WI 75, ¶ 22.
200. Id. ¶¶ 23–30.
201. 196 Wis. 2d 650, 539 N.W.2d 98 (1995).
202. Id. at 660–61.
203. Tetra Tech, 2018 WI 75, ¶¶ 32, 40.
204. Id. ¶ 42.
205. Id.
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His reasoning begins with what he presents as the basics of separation of
powers, which he characterizes as primarily about protecting against “tyranny”
and “depredations on our liberties.”206 There follows a recitation of the standard
distinction between “core” and “shared” powers, which in turn requires
consideration of whether the deference regime involves an abdication of
something at the core of the judicial power. It does, in Justice Kelly’s
assessment, because “exercising judgment in the interpretation and application
of the law in a particular case is the very thing that distinguishes the judiciary
from the other branches.”207
It is difficult to characterize Justice Kelly’s approach in reaching this
conclusion as the product of any clear methodology. The opinion cannot
credibly claim to be originalist since it makes no effort to pin down any sort of
original intent or understanding208 as of either the constitution’s initial drafting
and adoption or the revision of the judiciary provisions in 1977. There is no
mention of Busé v. Smith, and no effort to engage in any sort of analysis
reminiscent of its purported methodological commitments. Nor does the
opinion constrain itself by resorting to a common-law constitutionalism that
proceeds gradually from premises extracted from past decisions. Much like in
Gabler, the opinion instead seems to imagine that “the judicial power” exists
as a singular concept applicable at all times and in all places in the United States
legal tradition,209 then draws upon a grab bag of authorities, ranging from past
Wisconsin cases to the Federalist Papers to separate opinions (i.e., literal
expressions of opinion rather than statements of law in any formal sense) by
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Gorsuch in service of reaching its preferred
characterization.210 It is, for a court that has largely forsaken resort to legislative
206. Id. ¶ 45.
207. Id. ¶ 51.
208. Cf. Daniel R. Suhr & Kevin LeRoy, The Past and the Present: Stare Decisis in Wisconsin
Law, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 839, 841 (2019) (stating, in phrasing that Justice Kelly’s opinion does not
use, that the issue before the court was “Does agency deference comport with the original
understanding of the constitution?”).
209. Tetra Tech, 2018 WI 75, ¶ 54 (“When we distill our cases and two centuries of
constitutional history to their essence . . . .”).
210. Id. ¶¶ 45–54, 58–61. Justice Kelly also invoked concerns about the appearance of
impartiality, namely that deferring to agency’s interpretation in cases in which that very agency is
likely to be a party before the court creates the appearance of a biased tribunal. Id. ¶¶ 63–69. That
may be but creating the appearance of a maximally unbiased tribunal does not seem to have been at
the top of the court’s list of recent priorities. See, e.g., Christopher Terry & Mitchell T. Bard, An
Opening for Quid Pro Quo Corruption? Issue Advertising in Wisconsin Judicial Races. Before and
After Citizens United, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 305, 309 (2015) (“Research has already documented
a correlation between donations to justices in Wisconsin and favorable rulings in favor of campaign
supporters in more than fifty percent of cases, as well as the reality that Wisconsin Supreme Court
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history on grounds that it is too easy to pick and choose sources that support
one’s favored result,211 remarkable stuff.212
Notice, too, the framing of the situation. In Justice Kelly’s formulation,213
great weight deference involves the abdication of judicial authority subject only
to the “minimal” constraints imposed by the prior framework.214 Yet, even
assuming that situations in which “great weight deference” was applicable are
at least somewhat common, it is not so clear why deference to longstanding,
reasonable, executive interpretations (assuming administrative agencies in
Wisconsin are indeed best considered part of the executive branch215) is any
more an abdication than is the “beyond a reasonable doubt” deference given to
the legislature’s interpretation of the state constitution.216 One might instead
regard the framework as just one of many decision rules that the court, like
courts generally, uses to provide some steadiness to the law and to narrow the
scope of the questions before the court in a given case by fixing in advance the
range of considerations that will be applicable to a given decision.217 Phrased
in terms of a matter considered above,218 the court’s Kalal framework could
likewise be characterized as an abdication—at least in the sense that it precludes
judges from drawing on the full range of materials that they might otherwise
think pertinent to the proper exercise of the judicial power—or as a tool to
justices failed to recuse themselves in at least ninety-eight percent of cases in which one or more of the
participants had donated to one or more of the justices’ election campaigns.”).
211. See supra Section II.A.
212. It is undoubtedly no coincidence that, as Craig Green puts it, “ostensibly apolitical
arguments against Chevron [deference to agency interpretations of statutes] are actually part of a recent
phenomenon that has mirrored changes in partisan politics.” Craig Green, Deconstructing the
Administrative State: Chevron Debates and the Transformation of Constitutional Politics, 101 B.U. L.
REV. 619, 621 (2021).
213. As was the case in the essay by Justice Roggensack that he drew upon. See Roggensack,
supra note 162 (consistently describing the doctrines under consideration as “avoidance” doctrines).
214. Tetra Tech, 2018 WI 75, ¶ 56.
215. See supra Section II.
216. See supra Section II.B.
217. There is, additionally, the fact that the mere existence of a power does not entail the wisdom
of its use. Consider, for example, In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d
881 (1981), in which the court took up the question of whether circuit courts have the authority to
approve parental consent to the surgical sterilization of a child. The court reasoned that while the scope
of the judicial power in Wisconsin is certainly broad enough to encompass such authority, the mere
fact that jurisdiction exists does not mean that it is appropriate for a court to exercise it, due largely to
the policy-soaked nature of the inquiry. Id. at 573–76. The situations are, of course, not identical. But
to the extent that deference to executive interpretations turns on considerations like the ability to
“marshal informed persons to give an in-depth study to the entire problem and [to] secure the advice
of experts in the field,” id. at 570–71, then the logic of Eberhardy stands in tension with the court’s
conclusions in Tetra Tech.
218. See supra Section II.A.
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generate decisions that are more accurate, more consistent with separation of
powers principles, or otherwise more desirable. My point here is not to contend
that there is some sort of specific equivalence between the Kalal framework
and the deference framework jettisoned in Tetra Tech, but instead simply to
point out that it is not at all unusual for courts to impose limits on themselves
even when doing so might result in decisions that are less accurate than might
be the case under a regime in which decision-making was unfettered by such
constraints.219
It may well be that the result in Tetra Tech is an appropriate or even the
correct one. What is striking about it is not so much its result as that so much
of the reasoning Justice Kelly offers is abstract and unconnected to the
workings of Wisconsin government. For all its length, the opinion makes no
effort to situate the question within the existing doctrinal framework or the
institutional structure created by the Wisconsin constitution. Should it matter
that the Wisconsin legislature exercises comparatively tight control over
administrative rulemaking, such that rules ought to be regarded as products of
the legislature as well as the executive? Might that have been what previous
iterations of the court were hinting at when they characterized agencies as part
of the legislative branch?220 Ought the structural differences between the
federal government and Wisconsin’s government have some effect on the
analysis? Is there any reason to conclude that the separate opinions by Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Gorsuch—in which they were speaking for themselves
rather than through opinions that were products of the necessarily moderating
processes needed to produce an actual statement of law in a majority opinion—
are appropriate guides to the resolution of questions under the Wisconsin
constitution? We simply do not know.
In the end, Justice Kelly’s lengthy opinion gained a majority of votes for its
conclusions but not its rationale. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, joined by Justice
Abrahamson, concurred with the result on the narrow interpretive question
before the court.221 Justice Ziegler, joined by Chief Justice Roggensack,
criticized Justice Kelly for unnecessarily reaching constitutional questions.222
219. As I have suggested elsewhere, appellate courts’ extreme deference to jury and trial court
factfinding provides another example of a situation in which accuracy is sacrificed in the name of
expediency. Chad Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction,
57 VAND. L. REV. 437 (2004).
220. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d 207, 218, 466 N.W.2d 861, 865 (1991)
(“[A]dministrative agencies are a part of the legislative branch of government that created them . . . .”);
Schmidt v. Dep’t of Res. Dev., 39 Wis. 2d 46, 56, 158 N.W.2d 306, 312 (1968) (“The legislative
agency or director is, in fact, an arm or agent of the legislature itself.”).
221. Tetra Tech, 2018 WI 75, ¶ 109.
222. Id. ¶ 135.
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And Justice Gableman likewise disagreed with the need for Justice Kelly’s
constitutional analysis.223 Notwithstanding this lack of consensus as to its
rationale, the court subsequently confirmed its abandonment of its deference
regime.224
E. Koschkee & Koschkee
225

In Koschkee v. Evers, the court considered a preliminary motion in which
it was required to determine whether the Department of Public Instruction (DPI)
and its Superintendent were entitled to counsel of their own choosing in
litigation claiming that the DPI had not complied with requirements applicable
to agency rulemaking. The governor and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
contended that was entitled to take over the representation.
In an unsigned order, the court drew upon its superintending authority over
the court system to conclude that DPI could reject representation by DOJ.
Those powers, it reasoned, gave it power over the practice of law, which
extends to matters concerning the representation of a client.226 The court cited
two reasons underlying its ultimate conclusion:
First, accepting DOJ’s argument would foist upon Evers and
DPI an attorney they do not want (and have discharged), taking
a position with which they do not agree. This could have
ethical implications for DOJ attorneys. Second, accepting
DOJ’s argument would give the attorney general breathtaking
power. It would potentially make the attorney general a
gatekeeper for legal positions taken by constitutional officers,
such as the governor or justices of this court sued in their
official capacity.
DOJ’s position would not allow a
constitutional officer to take a litigation position contrary to the
position of the attorney general.227
The issue undoubtedly raises constitutional questions concerning the division
of labor within the executive branch, which would necessarily have separationof-powers implications, as well as questions relating to the allocation of
responsibilities among the branches, such as whether and when the legislature
or judiciary can opt for their own counsel. This is a complicated set of issues
and the court, perhaps wisely, does not engage with them at that level.

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. ¶ 159.
Myers v. Wis. Dept. of Nat. Res., 2019 WI 5, ¶ 17, 385 Wis.2d 176, 922 N.W.2d 47.
2018 WI 82, 382 Wis. 2d 666, 913 N.W.2d 878.
Id. ¶¶ 8–11.
Id. ¶ 13.
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In dissent, Justice Rebecca Bradley contended that the majority’s decision
not to allow DOJ to control the litigation threatened separation of powers.228
She reached this conclusion by way of an analytically prior conclusion that,
because the state constitution provides that the “qualifications, powers, duties,
and compensation” of the superintendent and other officers of the DPI “shall
be prescribed by law,”229 the DPI and its superintendent have no authority at all
unless the legislature provides it, and here the legislature had not provided it.230
This is by no means an obvious conclusion. On that view the constitutional
status of the superintendent would be meaningless—the voters would get to
choose who occupied the role, but the role might have no authority at all. The
legislature could pass a statute defining the duties of the superintendent as
serving as custodian of the legislative chamber or doing crossword puzzles and
that would be that. But it seems hard to believe that the constitutional
provisions creating distinct executive officers to be selected by statewide
elections should, under any conception of constitutional meaning, be regarded
as simply giving the voters the chance to select the identity of people who may
or may not actually exercise authority. The fact that an office is created in the
constitution suggests a set of reasons for why it was created, which in turn
implies a set of powers, responsibilities, and obligations.231 The implication of
Justice Bradley’s opinion is arguably to elevate the will of the people as
mediated through the legislature over the will of the people as manifested in
their selection of the superintendent.232

228. Id. ¶ 27 (Bradley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
229. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 1.
230. Koschkee v. Evers, 2018 WI 82, ¶ 37.
231. An analogous debate concerns Congress’ ability to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction.
Nothing in the federal Constitution requires the creation of lower federal courts. Does that
automatically mean that Congress could simply eliminate them, or take away their jurisdiction to
entertain certain sorts of claims? Under a thin literalism, yes. But the question is hardly free from
debate, and there’s a compelling case to be made that stripping federal courts of all or some substantial
portion of their jurisdiction would violate federal separation of powers principles. See, e.g., Henry M.
Hart Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,
66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953) (arguing that the Constitution’s grant of power to subject the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to “exceptions” and “regulations” “must not be such as will
destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan”).
232. Justice Bradley characterizes the court as exercising its power “in a manner that elevates
the interests of public officials over the interests of the people who elect them.” Koschkee v. Evers,
2018 WI 82, ¶ 41. The point is simply asserted rather than justified. And it overlooks the reality that,
due to gerrymandering, the superintendent arguably has a greater claim to represent the will of the
whole people of the state than does the legislature. See Miriam Seifter, Countermajoritarian
Legislatures, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1733 (2021).
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The underlying case made its way to the court as Koschkee v. Taylor,233 in
which the question was whether the superintendent must comply with a
legislatively imposed requirement to get approval from the governor before
drafting or promulgating an administrative rule. The court concluded that it
must. This time the court approached the case as presenting a question squarely
within the sphere of the separation of powers.
In doing so, the court proceeded from a definition of the legislative power—
at a general level, “to make laws, but not to enforce them”234—to conclude that
“when administrative agencies promulgate rules, they are exercising legislative
power that the legislature has chosen to delegate to them by statute.”235
Agencies thus have no inherent power to engage in rulemaking and “remain
subordinate to the legislature” in doing so.236 The court continued: “Because
the legislature has the authority to take away an administrative agency’s
rulemaking authority completely, it follows that the legislature may place
limitations and conditions on an agency’s exercise of rulemaking authority,
including establishing the procedures by which agencies may promulgate
rules.”237
The court’s analysis of the superintendent’s function—which it undertook
by reference to the Buse factors—revealed to it that that function was executive
in nature.238 Because the state constitution gives the superintendent no
legislative authority, and because rulemaking is a legislative rather than
executive act, the court reasoned, “it is of no constitutional concern whether the
governor is given equal or greater legislative authority than the [superintendent]
in rulemaking.”239
The court’s analysis here is very formalistic, its purported concern simply
with how the constitution divides power. It does not conceive of the case in
separation of powers terms by, for example, considering how requiring the
involvement of two parts of the executive branch affects the overall balance of
power between the legislative and executive branches. And while the court
acknowledges the practical necessity of delegation to administrative

233. 2019 WI 76, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600.
234. Id. ¶ 11 (quoting Schuette V. Van De Hey, 205 Wis. 2d 475, 480–81, 556 N.W.2d 127, 129
(Ct. App. 1996)).
235. Id. ¶ 12.
236. Id. ¶ 18.
237. Id. ¶ 20. Stated in such general terms, the point seems correct. But it does not follow that
there are no limits on the nature of the limitations and conditions the legislature may apply. See, e.g.,
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1984).
238. Koschkee, 2019 WI 76, ¶¶ 25–29.
239. Id. ¶ 34.
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agencies,240 practical considerations play no role in its analysis. In other words,
what drives the court is simply the conclusions it reaches about what kind of
power is at stake, rather than consideration of the consequences of the
requirement, whether assessed in terms of the balance of powers or according
to some exogeneous measure.
Justice Rebecca Bradley, by contrast, was quite happy to consider the
practical effects. She does not understate her concerns: “The concentration of
power within an administrative leviathan clashes with the constitutional
allocation of power among the elected and accountable branches of government
at the expense of individual liberty.”241 The idea that the administrative state is
a practical necessity, she asserts—relying heavily on a set of concurring
opinions written by Justices Gorsuch and Thomas and otherwise reasoning
primarily from federal sources—relies on “discredited principles.”242 Justice
Bradley stated that: “Underlying the movement toward a burgeoning
administrative state was the governing class’s sneering contempt for the people
who elect its members, along with impatience at any resistance of the people to
the views of the enlightened.”243 There is no discernable methodology at work
in her analysis. It cannot be originalism because she does not attempt to
discover what the framers and ratifiers of the Wisconsin constitution might have
understood about legislative delegation.244 The rhetoric is overheated, the
arguments only superficially legal, and the attitude not one of thoughtfulness
and detachment. It is, for a jurist, not shy about lobbing accusations of
partisanship at her colleagues, remarkably ideological in its tone.

240. Id. ¶ 17.
241. Id. ¶ 42 (R. Bradley, J., concurring).
242. Id. ¶ 43.
243. Id. ¶ 44.
244. Nor is there acknowledgement, much less engagement, with the growing body of scholarly
work suggesting that legislative delegation was in fact something that existed at the framing of the
United States Constitution. See, e.g., Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the
Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 280–82 (2021) (“In fact, the Constitution at the Founding
contained no discernable, legalized prohibition on delegations of legislative power, at least so long as
the exercise of that power remained subject to congressional oversight and control.”); Ilan Wurman,
Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 YALE L.J. 1490, 1494 (2021) (“Although the history is messy,
there is significant evidence that the Founding generation adhered to a nondelegation doctrine, and
little evidence that clearly supports the proposition that the Founding generation believed that Congress
could freely delegate its legislative power.”); Nicholas R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the
Originalist Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on
Private Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE L.J. 1288 (2021); Philip Hamburger, Delegating or
Divesting?, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 88 (2021); Christine Kexel Chabot, The Lost History of Delegation at
the Founding, 56 GA. L. REV. 81, 81–82 (2022).
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F. Bartlett v. Evers
In Bartlett v. Evers, the court considered a claim by a group of taxpayers
who challenged four specific instances of the Governor’s exercise of his partial
veto power.245 The court struck down three of the four, but because no rationale
garnered a majority, it announced its decision in a brief per curiam opinion,
which was followed by four separate opinions by Chief Justice Roggensack and
Justices Ann Bradley, Kelly, and Hagedorn. At the heart of the challengers’
case was a claim that the court’s decisions concerning the partial veto have
departed from the original meaning of the provision.
A bit of background on the partial veto is appropriate before getting to the
particular vetoes under consideration. Article V, Section 10 of the Wisconsin
constitution gives the Governor the power to veto legislation. It further
provides: “Appropriation bills may be approved in whole or in part by the
governor, and the part approved shall become law.”246 The corresponding veto
power in other state constitutions uses the word “item” rather than “part,” and,
based on that distinction,247 the Wisconsin Supreme Court has allowed the
Governor to exercise a broad ability to wield the power.248 Indeed, the
provision “grants to Wisconsin’s governor greater veto power than that
possessed by any other governor.”249 The scope of that power is perhaps best
appreciated by consideration of the limitations that have been imposed upon its
exercise by subsequent amendments to the state constitution: “In approving an
appropriation bill in part, the governor may not create a new word by rejecting
individual letters in the words of the enrolled bill, and may not create a new
sentence by combining parts of 2 or more sentences of the enrolled bill.” 250

245. 2020 WI 68, ¶¶ 1–2, 393 Wis. 2d 172, 945 N.W.2d 685.
246. WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10(b).
247. As the court put it:
[I]f, in conferring partial veto power, by the amendment of section 10, art. 5, Wis.
Const. in 1930, it was intended to give the executive such power only in respect
to an item or part of an item in an appropriation bill, then why was not some such
term as either “item” or “part of an item” embodied in that amendment, as was
theretofore done in similar constitutional provisions in so many other states,
instead of using the plain and unambiguous terms “part” and “part of the bill
objected to,” without any words qualifying or limiting the well-known meaning
and scope of the word “part”?
State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 313, 260 N.W. 486, 491 (1935).
248. “Wisconsin seems to be the only state in which the item veto has been used creatively, with
the approval of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, to create new law.” WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 308.
249. STARK & MILLER, supra note 9, at 161.
250. WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10(c).
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In a decision in which it denied the Governor’s attempt to reduce the
amount of revenue bonds a bill authorized, the court reviewed its cases and
identified the following parameters for the partial veto:
Certain principles emerge from the court’s interpretations of
this language. First, a governor may exercise the partial veto
only on parts of bills that contain appropriations within their
four corners. Second, the partial veto must be exercised in such
a manner that the part of the bill remaining constitutes a
“complete, entire, and workable law.” Third, the disapproval
of part of an appropriation bill may not result in a provision
which is “totally new, unrelated or non-germane” to the
original bill. Fourth, the partial veto authority extends to any
part of an appropriation bill, not only to appropriations. Fifth,
a governor may strike words or digits from an appropriation
bill. However a governor “may not create a new word by
rejecting individual letters in the words of the enrolled bill.”
Sixth, a governor may exercise the partial veto power by
writing in a smaller number for a number expressing an
appropriation amount.251
As a general matter, any veto power not limited to accepting or rejecting an
entire piece of legislation allows a governor to exercise power of the sort that
is most often associated with the legislative branch.252 Wisconsin’s partial veto
provisions enable its governor to exercise that power to an even greater degree.
To conclude that the power is therefore inherently legislative, though, requires
resort to a preconstitutional, ideal form of “legislative power” that somehow
exerts normative force over all actual constitutions. On this view it would be
possible to rank state constitutions in terms of the extent to which their veto
provisions give legislative power to the governor. But such an approach to the
definition of powers is not inevitable. One might instead conclude simply that
different constitutions allocate the powers of government, however they may
be labelled, differently among the different branches of government. The
President of the United States does not have a line-item veto, but the governors
of many states do, and the governor of Wisconsin does to an even greater
degree. None of that offends the basic requirement that a state have a

251. Risser v. Klauser, 207 Wis. 2d 176, 183, 558 N.W.2d 108, 111 (1997) (citations omitted).
252. State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 449, 424 N.W.2d 385, 393
(1988) (characterizing the governor’s partial veto authority as “quasi-legislative”); St. John’s Well
Child & Family Ctr. v. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 651, 660 (Cal. 2010) (“Case law, commentators,
and historians have long recognized that in exercising the veto the Governor acts in a legislative
capacity.”).
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republican form of government253 any more than does the fact that one state has
a unicameral legislature or that some states elect their judges and others do not.
Put differently, the Wisconsin constitution draws the line between the
legislative and the executive powers differently than do other constitutions. On
that view, the “executive power” as defined in the Wisconsin constitution
contains powers that are elsewhere given to the legislative branch, but that does
not necessarily make them a part of “legislative power” as the power is defined
in Wisconsin.
The four exercises of the partial veto at stake in the case involved deletions
that had the following effects: (1) converted grants for the replacement of
school buses into grants for alternative fuels; (2) changed a fund for grants for
local road improvements into a generic local grant; (3) eliminated decreases in
the registration fees applicable to certain vehicles; and (4) expanded the
definition of “vapor products” subject to taxation.254 In the estimation of one
set of commentators, these vetoes “differ little from partial vetoes made
regularly by governors of both political parties.”255 Yet the court struck down
all but the third.
As noted above, no rationale gained a majority. Writing for herself, Chief
Justice Roggensack traced the history of the partial veto and the court’s
opinions concerning it, concluding that “only two relevant limits”256 emerge:
“(1) the part approved must be a complete, entire and workable law; and (2) the
part approved must be germane to the topic or subject matter of the enrolled bill
before the veto.”257 She then leaned heavily on stare decisis in rejecting the
claimants’ invitation to overrule some of the court’s past decisions,258
253. There certainly are some limitations imposed by the federal Constitution. As Michael Dorf
has suggested, the Guarantee Clause together with other “constitutional provisions indicate that the
federal Constitution implicitly assumes that state governments will be structured along lines broadly
similar to the federal government.” Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State
Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 54 (1998). Carolyn Shapiro has recently
noted that Congress has the authority to enforce the Guarantee Clause and argued that it should do so
in order “to address democratic erosion in the states.” Carolyn Shapiro, Democracy, Federalism, and
the Guarantee Clause, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 183, 188 (2020).
254. Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶¶ 12–24, 393 Wis. 2d 172, 945 N.W.2d 685.
255. Richard A. Champagne, Staci Duros & Madeline Kasper, The Wisconsin Governor’s
Partial Veto after Bartlett v. Evers, 5 READING THE CONST., no. 5, July 2020, at 16,
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lrb/reading_the_constitution/governors_partial_veto_5_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8TCK-VWU9].
256. Bartlett, 2020 WI 68, ¶ 38.
257. Id.
258. Id. ¶¶ 65–89. In addition, although Chief Justice Roggensack early in her analysis seems
to accept the claimants’ characterization of their arguments as originalist, id. ¶ 67, she later identifies
the characteristics of that argument that undercut its status as originalist under any but a very loose
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concluding instead that the germaneness requirement she identifies in past cases
provides a sufficient tool for assessing the constitutionality of these vetoes.259
Justice Kelly, in an opinion joined by Justice Rebecca Bradley, “beg[s]
forgiveness for this pedantry”260 as he opens his opinion with a section entitled
“Schoolhouse Rock.” Based almost entirely on his inferences from the state
constitution’s text about what structures and processes it creates, and with no
effort to discern the original intent or understanding of those provisions, he
extracts three general propositions based on which, in his view, the questions
before the court should be resolved.261 From there he jumps into a critique of
the court’s development of the law, concluding that it was misguided because
of its failure to square with these propositions.262 Taken as a whole, the
opinion’s analysis assumes a fixed division of power among the branches that
it derives from a theoretical conception of government rather than from any
effort to pin down a meaning fixed at enactment, whether in 1848, at the time
of the amendments creating and later limiting the partial veto, or some
combination thereof. Put differently, the opinion seems to posit the existence
of some ideal form of American governmental structure—the particulars of
which are nowhere stated in a precise, canonical form—against which all
deviations are to be measured. Yet despite therefore not being an originalist
opinion, it nonetheless leans on theories of rejecting stare decisis that are largely
grounded in originalist reasoning.263
Justice Hagedorn, joined by Justice Ziegler, approaches the case as
requiring a quest to determine the original public meaning of the relevant
constitutional provisions. What his opinion lacks is much of anything in the
way of evidence bearing on what those original public meanings might have
been—which is, to be fair, the sort of information that is difficult to gather and
assess, involving as it would consideration not only of materials relating to the
basic governmental structure created in the 1848 constitution, but also of
materials relating to the meaning and effect of the later amendments creating
and limiting the partial veto. Some of the answers may be unknowable.

definition of the concept: that arguments from Montesquieu and the Federalist Papers do not, without
more, hold determinative force with respect to the meaning of the later-adopted Wisconsin constitution
and the amendments thereto. Id. ¶¶ 85–88.
259. “The legislature controls whether an idea will result in an enrolled bill that will be presented
to the governor for signature. A veto that does not alter legislative control of the topic or subject matter
of enrolled bills has been referred to as ‘germane.’” Id. ¶ 91.
260. Id. ¶ 178.
261. Id. ¶¶ 175–80.
262. Id. ¶¶ 182–90.
263. Id. ¶ 205.
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Perhaps as a result, Justice Hagedorn’s tone is more measured, and his
conclusions more tentative.264
Finally, Justice Ann Bradley, joined by Justice Dallet, assumes a largely
defensive posture in an opinion in which she advocates for continued
recognition of the “incredibly broad” scope of the Governor’s partial veto
power.265 Rather than making an affirmative case for the power, or
demonstrating how it is consistent with the Wisconsin constitution’s conception
of separation of powers, she limits herself to critique of the other opinions,
focusing on the practical problems their proposed tests would create, as well as
the fact that none of the opinions tracks a theory advanced by any of the
parties.266
A perhaps curious feature of these opinions is that not one invokes anything
like a deferential standard of review with respect to the Governor’s presumed
interpretation of the partial veto provisions of the state constitution. This even
though the court has afforded such deference in the past,267 and has more
recently noted that Justice Scalia, whose words are typically afforded canonical
status by some members of the court, suggested that deference to the executive
is appropriate as well.268 The executive, like the legislature, is a co-equal
branch of government. In recent years, however, the court has given the benefit
of the doubt only to the latter.

264. Id. ¶ 266 (rejecting the claim that the court should overrule the bulk of its past case law but
leaving open the possibility of revisiting those cases in the future).
265. Id. ¶ 115.
266. Id. ¶¶ 111–14.
267. For example, in Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 142 N.W. 595 (1913), a case arising out
of the governor’s removal of the state insurance commissioner via a perfunctory hearing presided over
by the Governor, the court noted: “It must not be understood that there is any want of appreciation here
of the fact that much deference is due to the co-ordinate department of the government, vitalized by
the Governor. It is the pleasure and the duty of the courts to pay that deference, and, perhaps, to resolve
reasonable doubts as to where mere deference ends, in favor of the executive department.” Id. at 213.
268. In State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 364 n.9, 441 N.W.2d 696, 701 n.9 (1989),
the court noted the following in a footnote:
Justice Scalia, in a portion of his dissenting opinion that is not disputed by the
majority in Morrison v. Olson, points out that perhaps the presumption of
constitutionality attaches equally to the conduct of any party in separation of
powers cases. Not only the legislature, but all branches of government are
presumed to act constitutionally. There is some doubt whether the presumption
is meaningful when dealing with questions of law.
(citations omitted).
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G. SEIU v. Vos
In Service Employees International Union v. Vos,269 the court considered
the constitutionality of several of the “lame duck” laws enacted by the
legislature and signed into law during the waning days of the Scott Walker
administration. The overall effect of these laws was to reduce the authority of
the governor and attorney general while giving more to the legislature, or to
legislative committees. The challenges in question were facial challenges.
Because the court was split with respect to the constitutionality of the some of
the provisions, there were two majority opinions.
The first majority opinion was written by Justice Hagedorn. It opened with
a lengthy discussion entitled “Separation of Powers Under the Wisconsin
Constitution.” In that section he begins by building off an idea introduced in
the opinion’s opening paragraphs: that there are three kinds of power—
legislative, executive, and judicial—and that the constitution, in order to
preserve liberty, divides them up.270 As a matter of rhetoric, the opinion
proceeds from the assumption that those three types of power have fixed
definitions. The opinion states: “Legislative power is the power to make the
law, to decide what the law should be. Executive power is power to execute or
enforce the law as enacted. And judicial power is the power to interpret and
apply the law to disputes between parties.”271 On this view, there is a natural
order of things, and departures from that order are exceptions, instances in
which “the Wisconsin Constitution . . . sometimes takes portions of one kind of
power and gives it to another branch.”272
These premises are debatable. To say that there are three types of power,
and to provide a general description of those powers, is not to answer questions
about how those powers work and interrelate in specific situations, at least so
long as one rejects the premise that the words legislative, executive, and judicial
necessarily refer to the same powers defined in precisely the same way whether
they are used in the United States, Wisconsin, or any other state’s constitution.
Rather than denoting some specific, idealized form, a word such as “legislative”
when used generically with the American legal system might instead refer to a
range of possible powers,273 in much the same way that the United States
Constitution’s reference to a “republican form of government” leaves room for

269. 2020 WI 67, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35.
270. Id. ¶¶ 1–2, 30–31.
271. Id. ¶ 1.
272. Id. ¶ 32.
273. See WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 238 (“Concepts such as ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ are,
of course, indeterminate.”).

OLDFATHER_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

898

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:845

substantial variation from one state to the next.274 We could, in other words,
imagine what the opinion conceives of as, in effect, exceptions to the general
arrangement, as instead being situations in which the Wisconsin constitution
defines things differently. As the discussion of Bartlett v. Evers,275 suggests, a
gubernatorial item veto has legislative effect, and the Wisconsin Governor has
the broadest such power. If we imagine governmental powers not as falling
into just three general categories, but instead consisting of powers defined at a
more precise level, then terms such as legislative and executive might simply
be regarded as labels for the buckets that hold those powers, with the specific
identity of the powers in the buckets varying from one jurisdiction to the next.
While it might thus be descriptively accurate to say that the terms typically
denote certain capabilities, it does not necessarily follow that what is
descriptively true has normative force.
Justice Hagedorn’s opinion nonetheless proceeds from the assumption that
the idealized forms have normative power and is careful to note that “these are
exceptions to the default rule that legislative power is to be exercised by the
legislative branch, executive power is to be exercised by the executive branch,
and judicial power is to be exercised by the judicial branch.”276 But the matter
is more complicated than that suggests, because the powers vested via the
constitution are not all of the same status—some of the powers are “core”
powers that cannot be taken by or given to another branch, while others are
“shared” powers that can be exercised by the other branches so long as, in doing
so, they do not “unduly burden or substantially interfere with another
branch.”277 This is all consistent with the general framework the court usually
invokes. It also, without more, answers no questions.
Critical to Justice Hagedorn’s approach is that the challenges in the case are
facial, which means that in order to succeed “the challenging party must show
that the statute cannot be enforced ‘under any circumstances.’”278 This
approach, he explains, is itself necessary as a consequence of the separation of
powers. To conclude that a statute is facially unconstitutional requires a court
to imagine all possible applications, which it may be incapable of accurately
doing. Judicial modesty counsels against attempting to do so.279
274. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
275. See supra Section III.F.
276. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶ 33.
277. Id. ¶ 35 (quoting State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 644, 594 N.W.2d 772, 776 (1999)).
278. Id. ¶ 38 (quoting League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 2014
WI 97, ¶ 13, 357 Wis. 2d 360, 851 N.W.2d 302).
279. Id. ¶ 42. Justice Dallet critiques the “no set of circumstances” approach as an overreading
of the applicable doctrine, as well as the claim that judicial modesty counsels in favor of such an
approach. Id. ¶¶ 176–87 (Dallet, J., dissenting).
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The first provisions under consideration require the consent of either the
legislative intervenor or the legislature’s Joint Committee on Finance before
the Department of Justice can “compromise or discontinue[]” civil actions
prosecuted by the department or settle actions where injunctive relief or a
consent decree are at stake.280 The challengers argued that this was
unconstitutional because it gave executive power to the legislature; the
legislature responded by asserting that, because the constitution provides that
the attorney general’s powers are to be defined entirely by statute, the
legislature is free to define them however it wants.281 The court disagreed,
reasoning that while the legislature may have the authority to define and limit
the attorney general’s powers, that does not mean that it can assume them for
itself.282 More palatable to the court was the legislature’s argument that the
statute related to the exercise of power that “is not, at least in all circumstances,
within the exclusive zone of executive authority.”283 The court’s analysis in
reaching this conclusion was traditionally, if not deeply, originalist.284 It
considered evidence that it regarded as probative of the understanding of the
constitution’s division of power at the time of its enactment in 1848.285 The
court further drew on the legislature’s interest in controlling appropriations,286
and the fact that some other states allow for similar legislative intervention.287
Absent from the analysis is any consideration of whether it is appropriate for
the legislature to delegate these responsibilities to a committee, which is at least
questionable if the court continues its formalist trend with respect to the nature
and separation of governmental powers.288
280. Id. ¶¶ 53 n.17.
281. Id. ¶¶ 55–56.
282. Id. ¶ 62.
283. Id. ¶ 63.
284. In dissent, Justice Dallet pointed out that the court has traditionally taken more of a
functionalist approach to separation-of-powers issues, id. ¶¶ 168–69 (Dallet, J., dissenting)., and
likewise disputed the majority’s more formalistic arguments. Id. ¶¶ 174–75 (Dallet, J., dissenting).
285. Id. ¶ 64–67.
286. Id. ¶ 68–69.
287. Id. ¶ 70.
288. I won’t attempt to develop the arguments in detail, but there would seem to be an argument
that the arrangement here allows for the exercise of legislative power without “the legislature” having
acted via the constitutionally prescribed mechanisms for the exercise of its power. (And if different
rules apply to the legislature’s exercise of other branches’ “shared” powers, it is not clear what they
are. Presumably the legislature could not simply designate one of its members as having the authority
to approve or disapprove of settlements.) Alternatively, a form of the nondelegation doctrine may be
applicable, with the legislature in this case delegating its authority to an entity that only seems like it
is part of the legislative branch because all its members are legislators. Whatever the specific legal
form of the argument, it would seem that there ought to be something at least suspicious about a
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The second concerned the process for changing security procedures at the
Capitol building and involved giving a legislative committee the authority to
review and, at the committee’s election, approve any such changes. The court
concluded that the power at issue is shared, and that “[i]t logically follows that
if the legislature can control the use of legislative space, as it already does in
many ways, it can also control the security measures put in place for the use of
that space.”289 The court noted but did not address arguments that the
legislative review mechanism involved “an impermissible legislative veto that
violates bicameralism and presentment as well as the constitution’s quorum
requirement.”290
The third provision,291 for which Justice Hagedorn wrote the majority
opinion, was one authorizing the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules to
suspend administrative rules more than a single time. The mechanism allowing
for initial suspension was the one approved in Martinez v. DIHLR,292 and it
authorized the committee to suspend a rule for three months, at the end of which
the rule would remain in effect unless the legislature responded by passing a
law through bicameralism and presentment.293 Wisconsin is an outlier in
allowing this sort of legislative review at all,294 and so it is not surprising that
the court did not look to other states or note the comparatively extraordinary
nature of the mechanism, instead simply invoking Martinez and concluding that
mechanism that allows a group of people who have been elected by a small subset of the state’s
electorate to override the decisions of executive branch authorities who were selected by statewide
election, particularly for a court that consistently emphasizes the will of the people. See, e.g., Id. ¶ 1
(“Government actors . . . only have the power the people consent to give them.”).
There is a similar dynamic at play in Democratic National Committee v. Bostelmann, 2020 WI 80, 394
Wis. 2d 33, 949 N.W.2d 423, in which the court addressed a question certified to it by the Seventh
Circuit: “whether, under Wis. Stat. § 803.09(2m), the Wisconsin Legislature has the authority to
represent the State of Wisconsin’s interest in the validity of state laws.” Id. ¶ 1. The court treated the
matter as purely a statutory question, which allowed it to conclude, in so many words, that the
legislature has the power because the legislature has given itself the power. Id. ¶ 8. The
appropriateness of allowing committees to exercise that authority on behalf of the legislature, and
thereby to represent the interests of “the state” even though, again, that committee’s membership is
unlikely to have been elected by anything approaching a majority of the state’s voters, is just assumed.
289. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶ 77.
290. Id. ¶ 75.
291. Justice Hagedorn’s opinion also resolved, in a single paragraph, a challenge to the
constitutionality of a provision prohibiting agencies from seeking deference to their legal
interpretations, concluding that its decision in Tetra Tech resolves the issues in favor of
constitutionality. Id. ¶ 84.
292. Discussed supra Section II.C.
293. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶ 81.
294. See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation
of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1203 (1999) (“Such review has been held
unconstitutional in almost every state considering the issue.”).

OLDFATHER_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

WISCONSIN SEPARATION OF POWERS

901

“if one three-month suspension is constitutionally permissible, two three-month
suspensions are as well.”295 Even so, the reasoning is notable. As discussed
above,296 Martinez was a thoroughly functionalist decision, and in that sense
consistent with what had been the court’s approach to separation of powers. It
stands as a contrast to the more formalistic approach taken in the rest of the Vos
opinion, and thereby demonstrates a potential consequence of the court’s
jurisprudential shift, namely that inconsistent application can lead to a pattern
of results that would have been unlikely had the approach been adherent to from
the start. In this case, the consequence is an accretion of more power in the
legislature.
Justice Kelly wrote the second majority opinion in the case, dealing with a
provision relating to “guidance documents,” which are agency-prepared
documents or communications that explain or provide guidance or advice with
respect to the agency’s procedures and likely application of statutes and rules.297
The statues under consideration would have required agencies to identify the
law that supports any conclusion in a guidance document, and set forth a set of
procedures to be followed in the creation of new guidance documents.298
The first step in Justice Kelly’s analysis was to determine whether the
creation of guidance documents is a legislative or executive power. His
methodology roughly tracks that he employed in prior cases. It is not
originalism in any recognizable form and includes no effort to pin down the
meaning of executive power as specifically placed in the Wisconsin
constitution in 1848 and modified by amendments thereafter. Nor does it
incorporate functional analysis, such as consideration of whether the effect of
the law might be to discourage agencies from producing guidance documents,
thereby driving the exercise of executive discretion underground rather than
keeping it publicly available. It lacks any but a perfunctory effort299 to survey
past Wisconsin cases concerning the executive power and to extract from them
some definition of greater or lesser generality that would resolve or at least
provide guidance for the resolution of the issue before the court. Instead, the
core portions of the analysis draw on law review articles, the Letters of
Alexander Hamilton, and opinions from the United States Supreme Court, all
of which point toward an abstraction: “At the risk of oversimplification, the
legislature’s authority comprises the power to make law, whereas the

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶ 82.
See supra notes 108–23 and accompanying text.
Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶ 89.
Id. ¶ 90.
Id. ¶¶ 97 n.6, 98.
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executive’s authority consists of executing the law.”300 And because the statute
in question itself states that “a guidance document does not have the force of
law,”301 they are not an exercise of the legislative power.302 More than that,
they are a core part of the executive power: “They contain the executive’s
interpretation of the laws, his judgment about what the laws require him to do.
Because this intellectual homework is indispensable to the duty to ‘take care
that the laws be faithfully executed,’ it is also inseparable from the executive’s
constitutionally-vested power.”303
300. Id. ¶ 95.
301. Id. ¶ 100 (quoting 2017 Wis. Act. 369, § 38 (WIS. STAT. § 227.112(3)).
302. Id. ¶ 102.
303. Id. ¶ 106 (citation omitted). The line of thought here is a bit hard to discern. I do not
understand the court to be saying the following, though I believe it would lead to the same result: As
is most evident in the case of prosecutorial discretion, enforcement discretion is a core part of executive
power. (A point that could presumably be supported by way of any interpretive methodology.)
Guidance documents represent efforts to inform the public about how the executive will exercise that
discretion, but by doing so do not eliminate or formally constrain the exercise of that authority, in the
sense that a new holder of the executive office in question could decide to exercise that discretion in a
different way, and indeed an office holder could decide to change their enforcement patterns or
priorities during their time in office. (That’s not to suggest that there’s no constraining effect, just that
it is informal.) So viewed, it is perhaps easier to appreciate how the statute under consideration
interfered directly in the exercise of core executive powers. The legislature can surely affect executive
behavior prospectively by changing the content of the law, but here the legislature sought to regulate
executive behavior midstream. One could thereby make an analogy to the aspect of judicial behavior
at stake in Gabler. Just as the legislature could change the law to prospectively govern the sorts of
decisions that Judge Gabler made, the court concluded that it was impermissible for the legislature to
empower a non-judicial entity to interfere once the judicial process had commenced.
Perhaps more directly analogous is State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 166
N.W.2d 255 (1969), a case considering a mandamus action to compel a district attorney to order an
inquest into a death. The court observed that “[t]he district attorney in Wisconsin is a constitutional
officer and is endowed with a discretion that approaches the quasi-judicial.” Id. at 260. Thus “a great
portion of the power of the state has been placed in his hands for him to use in the furtherance of
justice” and his “function, in general is of a discretionary type,” even though the legislature can
prospectively constrain its exercise “under particular facts.” Id. The court’s analysis seems correct,
though the opinion is emblematic of so many of its opinions from this era. It states the holding of a
past case in a largely conclusory way, makes no effort to extract any sort of underlying principle, then
purports to apply it to the current situation as if the process were simply algorithmic. There is a case
to be made for minimalism, but when the court fails to articulate the reasoning underlying it, and
thereby does not commit itself to much, it leaves much to good faith and the existence of shared norms,
both of which seem often to have been in short supply during the court’s recent era of dysfunction.
Returning to SEIU v. Vos, in his dissent, Justice Hagedorn sets forth a conception of guidance
documents as communications between the executive branch and the public, and therefore the sort of
thing that falls outside the scope of the executive’s core powers. Id. ¶ 191 (Hagedorn, J., dissenting).
The disagreement between Justices Kelly and Hagedorn may, as much as anything, demonstrate the
difficulties presented by facial challenges. The range of things that fall within the definition of
guidance documents is so broad that it undoubtedly encompasses documents that fall within the core
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IV. CRITIQUES AND OBSERVATIONS
At a general level, the work of the Wisconsin Supreme Court stands open
to the same basic set of critiques that commentators frequently direct at courts
interpreting state constitutions: the opinions too often rely on federal
constitutional case law and commentary, too rarely take into consideration the
real differences between the federal and state constitutions in terms of their text,
the governmental arrangements created by that text, the history behind the text,
and so on,304 and generally fail to explain their analyses with much depth or
sophistication.305 All of these observations have applied, to varying degrees at
varying times over its history, to the Wisconsin court. The court has
occasionally acknowledged the existence and implications of the differences
between the federal and state constitutions.306 But for the most part it has, as
Justice Hagedorn recently observed, “simply copied and pasted federal case law
and called it Wisconsin constitutional law.”307
A. The General Inaptness of the Federal-State Parallel
A consistent critique of state constitutional decision making is that courts
too often rely on federal constitutional case law without taking into serious
consideration the significant differences between the texts of the federal and
state constitutions, the governmental structures and arrangements created by
the respective texts, the differing histories and philosophies behind those texts,
and so on.308 Speaking generally about nineteenth-century state constitutions,
of executive power as well as the completely mundane. Chief Justice Roggensack likewise dissented
and made an effort to situate the guidance document requirement within the broader context of
Wisconsin separation-of-powers law. Id. ¶ 136 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting). She, too, framed the
matter as one of interpretation, which, as I have suggested above, may not have been the best avenue
of approach.
304. See WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 238–39 (“Each of the states has its own, virtually unique,
arrangements concerning the distribution of powers among and within the branches. Any careful
analysis of a separation of powers problem in state constitutional law, therefore, must take account of
the particular state’s specific arrangements.”).
305. See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 74, at 15–16.
306. See, e.g., State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984). The court noted that “in
drafting the Wisconsin Constitution the framers sought guidance not merely in the Federal Constitution
but also in the common law, the experiences, the tradition, and the values of the people of the territory
of Wisconsin.” Id. at 674. These differences, coupled with different language, led the court to conclude
that constructions of the federal speech and debate clause were of limited value in construing the state
clause. Id. at 675.
307. James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶ 65, 397 Wis. 2d 517, 960 N.W.2d 35 (Hagedorn, J.,
concurring).
308. See GARDNER, supra note 74, at 1–18. Gardner contends that critics fall into a similar trap
with respect to their methodological assumptions, too often assuming that the tools used for
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G. Alan Tarr describes the period as one with a clear divergence from the
federal constitutional experience.309
“Different issues dominated the
constitutional agendas of state and nation.”310 As Justice Ellen Peters observes,
“even though state constitutional provisions may textually resemble those
found in the federal Constitution, they may reflect distinct state identities that
will result in differences in how courts apply and construe such texts.”311
Thus, even if one were to assume that the federal and state constitutions are
fundamentally analogous things, it does not make sense, without further
justification, to draw upon cases interpreting the federal constitution or the
sources that informed the creation of the federal Constitution in interpreting the
Wisconsin constitution. The factors used to justify a lockstep approach to the
development and application of the rights provisions in state constitutions
largely do not apply with respect to separation of powers.312 And yet, as in most
states, there is a long tradition of the Wisconsin courts leaning on federal cases
in support of propositions relating to the separation of powers under the
Wisconsin constitution. This has become more pronounced recently, and in
particular a few of the justices have taken to engaging in lengthy analyses that
lean heavily on a specific subset of federal sources, which tend to include heavy
invocation of separate opinions (sometimes concurring, sometimes dissenting)
written by Justices Gorsuch, Scalia, and Thomas rather than actual majority
opinions. Those opinions also tend to include invocations of Montesquieu,

interpretation of the federal Constitution are the same tools that ought to be employed in the
interpretation of state constitutions. Id. at 15–16.
309. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 94 (1998).
310. Id. at 94–95.
311. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State
Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543, 1553 (1997).
Different state constitutions embody radically different visions of the relative
weight of the political branches. Some state constitutions were written to allow
their legislatures to dominate the processes of state government, weakening the
governor by splitting executive authority among several independently elected
state officials, by limiting the substantive powers of the governor, by limiting the
governor to one or a few terms of office, or through other mechanisms. Other
state constitutions show an obvious preference for a strong executive branch, and
manifest this preference through such mechanisms as limiting legislative
sessions, giving a governor extensive line-item veto authority, or through other
arrangements.
John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and
Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1205, 1240 (1993).
312. Not only in the sense that the constitutions themselves are different. There are fewer federal
precedents, and they are not binding on states, which together mean that the efficiency gains from
working with federal caselaw are greatly diminished. Schapiro, supra note 73, at 93.
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Locke, and other thinkers regarded as having influenced the framers.313
Underlying these opinions seems to be a sense that the concepts and
mechanisms of separation of powers in the American legal system exist as a
brooding omnipresence314 that, when divined by the appropriately attuned
jurist, yields a single correct answer to questions arising under all constitutions
within the system. The exercise looks less like originalism and more like a
form of pre-Legal Realism common-law constitutionalism that imagines the
correct answers are there to be discovered in the tea leaves left by the chosen
thinkers.315
That approach would seem self-evidently incorrect even were it the case
that the state and federal constitutions are fundamentally the same sort of
document. But that may be incorrect as well.316 It may be that it is wrong to
imagine that just because both the federal and state charters bear the title
“constitution” they therefore ought to be treated as the same thing for
interpretive purposes.317 For one thing, a state constitution is not the supreme
313. Setting aside for now the question of the extent to which the intellectual underpinnings of
the U.S. Constitution ought to serve as guidance for the interpretation and application of a state
constitution, it is not clear that the justices who invoke these sources draw the correct lessons from
them. The justices who do so tend to derive from them a rigid, formalistic approach to separation of
powers. But Jim Rossi suggests that at the founding that was the approach of the Antifederalists, while
the Federalists “recognized separation of powers but favored a blended or mixed conception of
separation of powers over a more rigid interpretation that was popular in state constitutions at the time.”
Rossi, supra note 294, at 1171. And, more broadly, William Gwyn argues that the framers “were
concerned more with improving the efficiency and capabilities of the national government than with
creating a system of government based on the abstract maxims of political philosophers.” William B.
Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the Age of the Framers, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 263, 263 (1989). “The framers clearly were not functioning as political theorists, carefully
distinguishing each type of power.” Id. at 266. Perhaps notably, Gwyn wrote in an era before these
issues were as ideologically charged as they are at the moment.
314. The term originated with Justice Holmes. “The common law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be
identified; although some decisions with which I have disagreed seem to me to have forgotten the fact.”
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
315. I do not mean to suggest that such sources are not pertinent to constitutional inquiry.
Making them the centerpiece of an effort to determine the meaning of a state constitution adopted in
1848, however, is a puzzling move given the professed jurisprudential commitments of the justices
who tend to do so. Cf. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 855
(1989) (“Are the ‘fundamental values’ that replace original meaning to be derived from the philosophy
of Plato, or of Locke, or Mills, or Rawls, or perhaps from the latest Gallup poll?”).
316. For an overview of what he characterizes as the “somewhat odd debate in the United States
about what might be termed the ontological status of . . . state constitutions,” see Sanford Levinson,
Courts as Participants in “Dialogue”: A View from American States, 59 KAN. L. REV. 791, 799–802
(2011).
317. Consider:
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law of the land. Even if were we to assume a state constitution that created a
governmental structure identical to that at the federal level, it would not
necessarily follow that state separation of powers should function in the same
way. In other words, the simple fact of occupying a different place in the larger
governmental hierarchy might imply different relations among the branches.318
So, too, the fact that state constitutions govern relationships between states and
local units of government that differ from the relationship between the federal
government and the states.319
More practical considerations might also have an effect. The relative
smallness of most states could matter by, for example, making it easier for the
branches to monitor one another. (Thus, for example, we might accordingly be
more open to the judiciary taking legislative motive into account, because
members of a state judiciary could reasonably be expected to know more about
the members and actions of a state legislature as compared to federal judges.)
The subsidiary nature of the state government could also matter. State-level
officials must comply with both federal and state law, and that responsibility to
an external set of commands perhaps exerts systematic pressures on the
relationships among the branches that would not exist in its absence. The
pressures might run in the other direction as well: A regime of state
constitutional law that thwarted state-level actors from effectively providing
desired services could in turn contribute to a demand for the underlying need to

State constitutions are sui generis, differing from the Federal Constitution in their
origin, function, and form. They originate from a very different process from that
which led to the Federal Constitution. State constitutions do not look or work
like the Federal Constitution. They are longer, more detailed, and cover many
more topics, for example, taxation and finance, local government, education, and
corporations. There are many policy decisions embedded in state constitutions.
Robert F. Williams, Interpreting State Constitutions as Unique Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 189, 191 (2002). See also James Gray Pope, An Approach to State Constitutional
Interpretation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 985, 985 (1993) (“At bottom, the problem with state constitutionalism
is . . . that state constitutions just aren’t all that constitutional.”); James A. Gardner, What is a State
Constitution?, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1025, 1025–26 (1993) (arguing that “state constitutions by and large
do not fit comfortably within our standard definition of ‘constitutions.’ Typically, state constitutions
do not seem to have resulted from reasoned deliberation on issues of self-governance, or to express the
fundamental values or unique character of distinct polities.”).
318. As Gardner notes, “federalism assigns to each level of government a somewhat different
role and, correspondingly, a set of distinct functions within the larger federal plan. Indeed, for
federalism to work at all, the state and national governments must of necessity serve different
functions; no sign of trouble in the federal system could be surer than the indiscriminate swapping of
functions by the two levels of government.” GARDNER, supra note 74, at 17.
319. See WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 241 (drawing on Lawrence Friedman, Unexamined
Reliance on Federal Precedent in State Constitutional Interpretation: The Potential Intra-State Effect,
33 RUTGERS L.J. 1031 (2002)).
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be met by federal regulation.320 The details will vary from one state to the next,
and, in Wisconsin at least, remain largely unexplored. Whatever the particulars,
their existence cautions against easy resort to federal sources.
B. Specific Differences Between Federal and State Institutions and Structures
In addition to the reasons outlined in the preceding section for skepticism
concerning the appropriateness of using federal sources for the resolution of
state constitutional questions, there are the specific ways in which the
governmental structure created by the Wisconsin constitution differs from that
of the federal government. What follows is a noncomprehensive survey of
some of those differences. Both collectively and individually there are
differences that can reasonably be understood to compel caution, at the very
least, with respect to the importation of federal standards.
i. Differences in the Legislative Branch
In the case of the legislature, the most significant difference is that state
legislatures have the police power, while Congress is an entity with only
enumerated powers.321 And even though Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce has come to approach a police power in its breadth, there
remains a fundamental distinction in that Congress must ask first whether it has
the power to act, whereas state legislatures are regarded as having the power to
act unless something in the state’s constitution—perhaps a rights provision,
perhaps an aspect of separation of powers—prevents it. States’ constitutions
are, therefore, “documents of limitation rather than documents granting
powers. . . . Thus, the basic legal and political function of state constitutions
differs from that of the federal Constitution.”322
In Wisconsin, in particular, the legislature enjoys more power relative to
administrative agencies than is the case in the federal government and in most
other states. As Jim Rossi reports, “almost every state considering the issue”
has concluded that giving a legislative committee the power to suspend agency
rules is unconstitutional.323 But there are outliers: “Courts in Idaho and
Wisconsin have explicitly authorized stronger legislative oversight than other

320. Rossi, supra note 294, at 1187–88.
321. “This court has repeatedly held that the power of the state legislature, unlike that of the
federal congress, is plenary in nature . . . .” State ex rel. McCormick v. Foley, 18 Wis. 2d 274, 277,
118 N.W.2d 211, 213 (1962). “It is also recognized that the Wisconsin Constitution is not a grant of
power, but a limitation upon the powers of the legislature. Except for these limitations the power of
the legislature is practically absolute.” Id. at 279.
322. WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 27.
323. Rossi, supra note 294, at 1203.
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states.”324 As I have suggested above,325 formalistic analysis of the sort the
court has recently favored would seem to call this approach—and the wide
range of matters the Wisconsin legislature delegates to committees more
generally—into question.
ii. Differences in the Executive Branch
The two most apparent points of contrast between the federal and
Wisconsin executive branches are the partial veto and the fact that the state
constitution creates several constitutional executive officers elected by
statewide vote. The partial veto, which as noted above affords Wisconsin’s
governor more power than any other governor,326 was in part a response to the
perceived inefficiency and corruption of the legislative branch.327 The
constitutional “unbundling”328 of the executive power serves at least two
functions—as an “internal check”329 on executive power, by placing authority
in multiple sets of hands, each with its own electoral base,330 and as an
additional layer of separation vis-à-vis the legislative and judicial branches,
such that any action by either such branch operates against only a portion of the
executive.
Another important difference lies in the area of implied or inherent powers.
The extent to which the President does and ought to have such powers is
contested.331 The idea that state-level executive officers, whether the governor
or any of the other elected members of the executive branch,332 possess inherent
324. Id. at 1209. One would expect such a difference to undercut any arguments for the need for
a robust nondelegation doctrine. The fact of ongoing legislative control should make it less necessary
for the legislature to articulate more specific parameters for the exercise of administrative power at the
outset.
325. See supra notes 115 and 288.
326. See supra Section III.F
327. Kersh, Mettler, Reeher & Stonecash, supra note 96, at 32–34.
328. Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1386 (2008).
329. Schapiro, supra note 73, at 102.
330. Precisely how, and how well, this works is a complex pair of questions. See Miriam Seifter,
Understanding State Agency Independence, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1537 (2019).
331. See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century: An
Introduction, 88 B.U. L. REV. 341 (2008) (providing an overview of debates over the scope and
contours of executive power in the federal government); Jenny S. Martinez, Inherent Executive Power:
A Comparative Perspective, 115 YALE L.J. 2480 (2006) (undertaking a comparative analysis of
executive power).
332. The court has expressly held that, notwithstanding the constitutional status of the position,
“the attorney general’s powers are prescribed only by statutory law.” State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000
WI 9, ¶ 24, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2D 526. That does not necessarily imply the absence of
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powers to act, such as in an emergency, is unfamiliar enough that arguments to
that effect played no significant role in recent litigation over the government’s
response to the COVID-19 pandemic.333 At the federal level, meanwhile, it is
common to encounter depictions of the President’s authority as nearly
unconstrained.334
iii. Differences in the Judicial Branch
Just as the state legislature possesses the comparatively (relative to its
federal counterpart) unbounded police power, so, too, does the state judiciary

constitutional limits. Whether one approaches the question from an originalist perspective or
otherwise, it seems reasonable to conclude that the framers assumed a baseline level of good faith on
the legislature’s part such that, for example, an effort to completely strip the office of its powers could
not stand.
333. See Fabick v. Evers, 2021 WI 28, 396 Wis. 2d 231, 956 N.W.2d 856 (2021) (considering a
challenge to the governor’s continued declaration of public health emergencies); James v. Heinrich,
2021 WI 58, 397 Wis. 2d 517, 960 N.W.2d 350 (2021) (considering a challenge to a Dane County
health order closing schools). This lack of recognition of inherent executive power is generally
characteristic of state constitutions. See WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 304 (“Generally speaking, the
governor must be able to point to either constitutionally granted or statutorily granted power in order
to exercise legal authority.”). Meanwhile the court has had little difficulty concluding that the judiciary
enjoys a broad array of inherent and implied powers. See, e.g., In re Janitor of the Supreme Court, 35
Wis. 410, 419 (1874) (“It is a power inherent in every court of record, and especially courts of last
resort, to appoint such assistants; and the court itself is to judge of the necessity.”); In re Courtroom,
148 Wis. 109, 121, 134 N.W. 490, 495 (1912) (“Circuit courts have the incidental power necessary to
preserve the full and free exercise of their judicial functions, and to that end may, in appropriate cases,
make ex parte orders without formally instituting an action to secure the desired relief.”); State v.
Cannon, 199 Wis. 401, 402, 226 N.W. 385, 386 (1929) (“The courts established by the Constitution
have the powers which are incidental to or which inhere in judicial bodies, unless those powers are
expressly limited by the Constitution. But the Constitution makes no attempt to catalogue the powers
granted.”); In re Kading, 70 Wis. 508, 518, 235 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1975) (“The function of the judiciary
is the administration of justice, and this court, as the supreme court within a statewide system of courts,
has an inherent power to adopt those statewide measures which are absolutely essential to the due
administration of justice in the state.”); State v. Schwind, 2019 WI 48, ¶ 14, 386 Wis. 2d 526, 926
N.W.2d 742, 747 (2019) (“Inherent authority of the court derives from the doctrine of separation of
powers.”). There are, however, limits. See, e.g., State v. Braunsdorf, 98 Wis.2d 569, 586, 297 N.W.2d
808, 815–16 (1980) (declining to recognize an inherent power to dismiss a criminal case with prejudice
based on history and a concern that the power would be “too great an intrusion into the realm of
prosecutorial discretion”); Grabarchik v. State, 102 Wis.2d 461, 466, 307 N.W.2d 170, 174 (1981)
(concluding, based in part on separation of powers principles, that “[t]he fashioning of a criminal
disposition is not an exercise of broad, inherent powers.”).
334. See, e.g., ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 3–4 (2011) (contending that the primary constraints on presidential power are
not legal but come from “politics and public opinion”).
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possess a broader range of power.335 Federal courts have limited jurisdiction.336
By contrast, in the first year of statehood, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
described the state’s circuit courts as vested by the state constitution “with
greater powers than were probably ever before, in a free government, delegated
to any one tribunal—the united powers of the English King’s Bench, common
pleas, exchequer, and chancery,”337 a characterization repeatedly invoked by
the court over subsequent decades.338 The Wisconsin judiciary has general
jurisdiction, and exercises that jurisdiction in ways that regularly depart from
the classically adversarial proceedings to which the federal judiciary is limited
by virtue of the federal Constitution’s “cases and controversies” requirement.
Problem-solving courts serve as a recent manifestation of this sort of departure
from the traditional model of adjudication. Such contrasts with the federal
judiciary are present at the appellate level as well, perhaps most notably in the
state supreme court’s supervisory power.
Some additional significant points of contrast:
• The judiciary is elected. This is a point that is obvious, and
seemingly significant, but also almost always overlooked.
The counter-majoritarian difficulty—which in federal

335. For an analysis of the ways in which state judicial power, in general, differs from the federal
judicial power, see Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001).
336. For an express recognition of differences in the extent to which Congress and the state
legislature can regulate the jurisdiction of the courts, see John F. Jehlke Co. v. Hill, 208 Wis. 650, 242
N.W. 576, 580 (1932).
337. Putnam v. Sweet, 2 Pin. 302 (1849).
338. See, e.g., State ex rel. Attorney General v. Portage City Water Co., 107 Wis. 441, 447, 83
N.W. 697, 699 (1900); Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 227, 99 N.W. 909, 933 (1904).
We shall see that, standing where we will and looking where we may, judicial
power is present to prevent and redress wrongs. We take a view to the very
horizon of our mental perception within the scope of human capacity to violate
obligations other than those of a purely moral nature, and the jurisdiction of the
circuit courts, except as specifically restricted by statute within legislative power
to do so or by the Constitution itself . . . is found to occupy the whole field with
instrumentalities designed, and as well adapted as human wisdom has been
capable of making them, to execute its function to completeness.
Id. For a similarly broad characterization of the reach of the judicial power even past the 1977
amendments to the constitution, see In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 539, 548–50, 307
N.W.2d 881, 885–86 (1981) (noting the “extremely broad” grant of jurisdiction to the courts, and that
the constitution “does not permit the legislature to divest the constitutional grant of jurisdiction from
the unified court system”). Dicta in a recent opinion overlooks this characterization of the Wisconsin
constitution’s vesting of the judicial power. State v. Schwind, 2019 WI 48, ¶ 13, 386 Wis. 2d 526, 926
N.W.2d 742 (2019) (suggesting that the constitution’s use of the word “court” “was referring to the
institution known as a court, together with the powers it was generally understood at common law to
possess.”).
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constitutional law flows from the problem of having an
unelected judiciary striking down the acts of the people’s
elected representatives339—simply doesn’t exist in the
same form. Indeed, there is a sense in which any given
member of the state supreme court, having been elected by
a majority of voters statewide, has a greater claim to
democratic legitimacy than any subset of the state
legislature.340 To the extent, then, that the fact that justices
on the U.S. Supreme Court are unelected plays a central
role for arguments relating to judicial review, that factor is
not present with respect to the Wisconsin judiciary.
The U.S. Supreme Court has been generally reluctant to
interpret any of the Constitution’s rights as encompassing
positive (the right to something) in addition to negative
(the right to be free from something) entitlements.341 In
part this is a function of intuitions about institutional
design and function—the implementation of positive
rights requires ongoing management, while the
adjudication of negative rights typically involves the sort
of retrospective assessment of past conduct that is in
courts’ wheelhouse. But the state constitution includes
grants of positive rights.342 (Examples include the
entitlement “to a certain remedy in the law for all injuries,
or wrongs, which he may receive in his person, property,
or character” in Art. I, sec. 9, and the crime victim’s rights
provisions in Art. I, sec. 9m.) The positive rights
provisions in the Wisconsin constitution are not as
extensive as those in other state constitutions, but they
nonetheless might be taken to support the proposition that

339. “The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system.”
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16 (1962).
340. In at least one telling of the story this connection is not incidental:
The development of judicial review accompanied the move toward the election
of judges. While many have contested and viewed judicial review at the national
level as a usurpation of power by one insulated branch, in the context of state
government—by contrast—many viewed the concept as an extension of popular
rule. Judges, as elected officials, were to act as the people’s guardians,
overturning acts of legislative excess.
Kersh, Mettler, Reeher & Stonecash, supra note 96, at 25.
341. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1132–35 (1999).
342. Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State Constitutions as Unique Legal
Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY L. REV. 189, 192 (2002) (noting the significance of positive rights
provisions in state constitutions).
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the judiciary must necessarily take on a different role,
because otherwise those rights would go unenforced.343
Even if the legislature or executive bear primary
responsibility for the enforcement of positive rights, their
existence alone would seem to have implications for the
relationships among the branches.
The state judiciary retains some common-law lawmaking
authority.344 Thus state courts have a reservoir of
lawmaking authority that exists independently of their
democratic base—because the common law has been
created and shaped even by unelected courts—which is
worth taking into account in determining how those courts
ought to exercise their roles relative to the other branches
in the adjudication of separation-of-powers disputes,
including, perhaps, the task of statutory interpretation.345

343. Helen Hershkoff argues that “[t]he enforcement of positive rights . . . requires a state court
to share explicitly in public governance, engaging in the principled dialogue that commentators
traditionally associate with the common law resolution of social and economic issues.” Hershkoff,
supra note 341, at 1138.
344. For an early opinion concerning the continued vitality of the common law in Wisconsin
after the adoption of the state constitution, see Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147 (1864). A decade later,
in Attorney General v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 35 Wis. 425 (1874), Chief Justice Ryan held forth at
length about the appropriateness of extending the judicial power to reach the larger and different
problems posed by industrialization. Id. at 530–32. And in Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Clark,
145 Wis. 181, 183, 129 N.W. 1065, 1065–66 (1911), the court emphasized the contingent nature of the
common law, quoting Francis Bacon: “As waters do take tincture and taste from the soil through which
they run, so do laws vary according to the region where they are planted, though they proceed from the
same fountains.” In Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962), the court rejected the
argument that the constitution prohibits it from adopting or changing common-law principles:
Inherent in the common law is a dynamic principle which allows it to grow and
to tailor itself to meet changing needs within the doctrine of stare decisis, which,
if correctly understood, was not static and did not forever prevent the courts from
reversing themselves or from applying principles of common law to new
situations as the need arose.
Id. at 11. See also Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967) (expounding on the
evolving nature of the common law); Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 631–32, 350 N.W.2d 108,
111 (1984) (expressly noting the evolutionary and adaptable nature of the common law). But see
Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209, 227 (1911) (observing, with respect to the common
law, “No court in our time has had competency . . . to change or create or destroy in that field. Power
in that regard was expressly reserved to the Legislature.”). The court has invoked a similar power to
develop more concrete standards in the application of broad statutory language. Balistreri v. State, 83
Wis. 2d 440, 449, 265 N.W.2d 290, 294 (1978).
345. See Peters, supra note 311, at 1555 (“State courts have the opportunity to consider not only
the entire body of statutory enactments but also the large reservoir of common law principles that
continue to fall exclusively within the judicial domain.”); Id. at 1557 (“There is no readily discernible
parallel in the federal courts to the capacity of state courts to craft a legal landscape that encompasses
and harmonizes statutory and common law principles.”).
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In this sense, as Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde
noted, state courts “share directly in governance” in a way
that federal courts do not.346
James Gardner takes the point in a slightly different direction, observing
that “nothing in the United States Constitution requires a state to have a written
constitution in the first place, and if a state lacked a written constitution the
courts would presumably take an active role in creating an unwritten one, as
they have in England.”347
C. Methodological Pluralism Versus Methodological Inconsistency
As suggested in Part I, the early history of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
was one in which the justices engaged in methodological pluralism. The court’s
early decades of work evidence no concern with methodological purity, no
belief that the framers of the Wisconsin constitution were concerned, above all,
with fealty to some set of abstractions that might have been dominant in the
intellectual air sixty years prior. It was not the job of a judge to build idealized
castles in the sky against which to measure human institutions, but rather to
exercise judgment to determine which analytical tools were appropriate to the
task at hand, often if not always informed by an understanding that among the
foremost hopes of the framers of any constitution is to create a government that
works.
A shift occurred in the mid-1970s,348 at which point the court began to
invoke a variety of originalism as its preferred interpretive methodology. The
following is a representative statement of its approach:
Constitutions should be construed so as to promote the objects
for which they were framed and adopted. “The constitution
means what its framers and the people approving of it have
intended it to mean, and that intent is to be determined in the
light of the circumstances in which they were placed at the
time[.]” We therefore examine three primary sources in
determining the meaning of a constitutional provision: the
plain meaning, the constitutional debates and practices of the
time, and the earliest interpretations of the provision by the
legislature, as manifested through the first legislative action
following adoption.349
346. Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner’s Failed
Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927, 952 (1993).
347. Gardner, supra note 317, at 1051.
348. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
349. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, ¶ 19, 295 Wis. 2d 1, 719 N.W.2d
408 (citations omitted).
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But, as further outlined in Part I, the court did not consistently transport that
approach into its consideration of issues under the Declaration of Rights or with
respect to the separation of powers. And lately some of the justices have shown
a taste for an approach that relies on history, but not the history of the Wisconsin
constitution. Rather than focusing on 1848 or attempting to account for the
changes worked by any intervening amendments, the opinions instead discuss
Montesquieu, Locke, and the Federalist Papers without bothering to connect
those sources to the thinking of the framers of the Wisconsin constitution,
which of course took place more than a half-century later. They do so not
recognizing that “when the framers referred to foreign writers such as
Montesquieu, ‘they did so to embellish an argument, not to prove it. The
argument itself was grounded on what had been learned at home. Theory
played a role, but it was always circumscribed and tested by experience.”350
Instead, the underlying assumption seems to be that there is a “brooding
omnipresence”351 of American constitutional common law, such that powers
can be defined and separated in but a single way. On this view, the state
constitution’s invocations of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers
were references to fixed, ideal conceptions of those powers, such that the proper
interpretive approach is one that maintains (or returns to) the contours of those
ideals. A further assumption seems to be that the framers meant for the powers
to maintain a perpetually fixed form for their own sake rather than because the
specified allocation served an instrumental purpose that was the true object of
the arrangement. And yet, curiously, the justices engage in this sort of analysis
while also invoking a very instrumentalist basis for the separation of powers,
namely the avoidance of tyranny.352
One could, of course, simply regard these recent departures as a simple
continuation of the pluralist tradition. The court’s utilization of its

350. Gwyn, supra note 313, at 263 (quoting LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER
4–5 (1972)).
351. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
352. A more substantive criticism of this approach is that its focus on maintaining a rigid
conception of the powers creates the possibility (perhaps better stated as the likelihood or certainty)
that exogeneous factors will lead to shifts in the balance of power even if the structure of government
were to remain entirely unchanged. Stated somewhat differently, it seems inevitable that the 1848
government transported to 2021 would operate differently, and have a different balance of power, than
it did in 1848. Changes in the nature of the world—a larger, denser, more globally connected
population—lead to changes in the nature of the problems confronted by government, and that different
set of demands will play to the strengths of the branches in different ways. There may, for example,
simply be more situations in the modern world calling for the exercise of executive power, which in
turn would shift the balance toward the executive even without a change in the formal structure of
government. (Indeed, it is just that sort of thing that seems to have led to the formation of the
administrative state.).
AND POLICY
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methodological frameworks has never been entirely consistent, and these
opinions could simply be additional examples of exceptions. On that view the
correct takeaway is that, despite the superficial methodological consensus
within these domains,353 the court has not, in fact, adopted a single, overarching
vision of what the state constitution is or how it should be interpreted and
applied. The Busé framework suggests a crude version of originalism, but the
court’s approach to rights with a federal analogue is fundamentally inconsistent
with originalism. The court’s separation of powers jurisprudence, with its
sporadic invocations of originalism, stands somewhere in the middle.
None of this is necessarily bad. This sort of methodological pluralism has
characterized the court’s jurisprudence from the beginning.354 That is
unsurprising from a multimember court the composition of which changes over
time. And while one fully committed to an originalist approach might argue
otherwise, to adhere too rigidly to such an approach seems to elevate form over
function, to imagine that constitutional framers were more interested in
designing a conceptually perfect system than in designing a system that works.
After all, past iterations of the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized as much:
“The framers of the constitution were practical men, and were aiming at
practical and useful results.”355

353. And that consensus may be more apparent than real. In other words, thorough consideration
of the opinions within these methodological categories could easily reveal a pattern of results that
suggests the decisions are driven by something other than the purported framework, or that the court
does not even consistently apply the framework. For example, the court in Kalal adopted an analytical
framework for statutory interpretation that it purports to apply consistently to all cases. But there are
exceptions. In Wisconsin Legislature v. Evers, for example, Justice Rebecca Dallet called out the
court’s majority for not applying Kalal when interpreting the term “security of persons.” No.
2020AP608-OA
(Wis.
Apr.
6,
2020)
(per
curiam),
https://www.wicourts.gov/news/docs/2020AP608_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV7Y-JWR4]. And the
court has developed an entirely distinct framework for interpreting criminal statutes in situations where
the question is whether a statute creates a strict liability crime. State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶¶ 64–
78, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 37, 863 N.W.2d 592, 610. It is possible to square the two approaches—that is, to
conclude that Luedtke assumes that any statute lacking an express mens rea element is inherently
ambiguous, such that resort to its additional set of factors is appropriate—but the Luedtke opinion
makes no effort to do so, and indeed gives no indication that the court was even cognizant of the
tension, despite the fact that both Luedtke and Kalal were before the court at the same time.
354. It has likewise characterized constitutional adjudication at the federal level. See generally
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1984) (presenting a
typology of constitutional arguments).
355. State v. West Wis. Ry. Co., 34 Wis. 197, 212 (1874). See also Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.
Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Wis., 136 Wis. 146, 160, 116 N.W. 905, 910 (1908) (cautioning against an
interpretive approach that would “presuppose that by the adoption of the Constitution the state so
manacled itself as to be helpless to exercise old and well-known governmental powers or to apply such
powers to new problems or new conditions”).
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Pluralism slips through, as well, in the court’s selective pattern of
deference. Of late, it has shown itself to be eager to defer to the legislature’s
assessments of the constitutionality of its legislation—though much less
consistently in separation of powers cases—but not to the governor’s. It has
limited its own ability to consider legislative history in the interpretation of
statutes, but at least some of its justices eagerly consult the political
philosophers understood to have influenced the thinking of the framers of the
constitution that served as one of the models for the Wisconsin constitution.
The problem is not the pluralism. The problem is that by purporting to
commit to methodological frameworks but then inconsistently invoking them,
and by appearing to invoke deference only when convenient, the court feeds the
perception that the justices’ motivations are extra-legal.
D. The Complexity of Separation of Powers and the Appropriateness of
Judicial Humility
Viewed relative to either the federal system or its fellow states, Wisconsin
has historically had a distinct separation of powers jurisprudence. What it does
not so clearly have is a coherent separation of powers jurisprudence. Separation
of powers questions are complicated, and the potential for unintended
consequences is large. Slight adjustments to the power of one branch of
government, or to the relative distribution of power between two branches of
government,356 can have implications that ripple through the system. The
resolution of any given case will require drawing on principles that have
implications not only for future cases within the narrow doctrinal bounds
presented, but also for more broadly analogous cases and doctrines elsewhere
within the larger universe of constitutional law (and adjacent doctrinal areas).
Even a state constitution that has been amended relatively few times will reflect

356. Consider, for example, Kalal and the question of statutory interpretation. The approach
that a court takes to giving effect to statutory language unquestionably has implications for the balance
of power between the judicial and legislative branches. As I have suggested above, Kalal has
implications for the nature of the legislative power (in at least some respects it can be exercised only
through the bicameral passage of a collection of words) and the judicial power (cutting judges off from
considering otherwise relevant and probative information). One could imagine a very different
approach. For example, instead of Kalal’s modified textualism a court—particularly one on which the
justices have been elected by statewide vote—might choose to treat statutes as more akin to judicial
precedent, at least in the sense that divining their underlying purpose would be thought more important
than a technical parsing of their language. Such a court might similarly elect to continue to aggressively
employ the maxim that “statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed.” Kalal,
2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 45–50. Kalal certainly recognizes in a general way that it concerns the separation of
powers, but the fact that the court did not invoke its traditional core/shared powers framework suggests
that, for reasons that remain unstated, it did not identify the case as presenting a “separation of powers”
issue. Id.
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conflicting perspectives, making it difficult at best to formulate a single
coherent theory or set of theories by which to undertake the task of
interpretation.357 Wisconsin’s constitution has seen, at the very least, the
addition of the line-item veto and the restructuring of the judiciary in addition
to all the social changes that have led to the development and growth of
administrative agencies.
For these reasons, separation-of-powers cases provide an especially vivid
demonstration of the risks inherent in case-by-case adjudication. Any given
case involves at most a handful of discrete issues. For various reasons—limited
resources, lack of broader familiarity with state constitutional law, the
incentives created by their desire to win this case rather than to shape the
development of the law more generally and thus to forgo any effort to fit their
dispute into anything broader than the doctrinal category in which it arises, or
in the case of some types of litigants to use this case to increase the likelihood
of achieving some larger goal with respect to the development of the law—the
arguments offered by the parties are likely to be focused more on trees than
forest. Judges, as former lawyers, may have become habituated to this way of
approaching cases, and are otherwise subject to all the psychological tugs that
the “this-ness” of any given case will produce.358 A given situation will
implicate only a portion of the legal landscape and may well not be
representative of the larger class of cases that fall within that area. Moreover,
the court, as an institution, does not remain static over time, but instead speaks
through different voices that state the positions of majorities that are not
constant from one case to the next on behalf of a court the nature of which
changes along with its personnel. To expect perfect coherence and consistency
across cases and across time would therefore be to expect too much. The
dynamic counsels in favor of humility and tentativeness. A given majority
cannot be certain that it has considered all the information necessary to avoid
tension or conflict with related but distinct bodies of doctrine.359
The bulk of the court’s opinions throughout its history, even those relating
to the relatively high-profile conflicts of the sort in which separation of powers
questions tend to arise, have been unremarkable and unmemorable. Past cases
are invoked in mostly conclusory ways, and the opinions provide no evidence
that the court has attempted to tease out the underlying ideas or contemplate the
ways they do (or do not) coalesce into more general principles that apply across
doctrinal frameworks. This approach is, in an important sense, admirable. The
357. See, e.g., G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 194 (1998).
358. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006).
359. For a general recognition of this dynamic, see In re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 307
N.W.2d 881, 895, 899 (1981).
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justices were acting as common-law judges, eschewing the temptation (if that
is even how they experienced it) to rethink things anew in each case. They
weren’t trying to attract the attention of someone who might appoint them to a
federal court, they weren’t trying to shift the law in dramatic ways, they weren’t
playing to a crowd made up of a certain subset of the bar.360 Or perhaps what
the bar respected was different—perhaps what the bar generally respects today
is still different, but the dynamics have changed due to greater ideological
fragmentation, such that it is the views of specific subsets of the bar that will
matter most—and the values were on modesty and practicality. This shallow
reliance on the past may not have been ideal, in roughly the same way that rules
can never provide the justice that would result from a perfectly administered set
of standards, but when coupled with a disinclination toward radical change it
greatly reduces the likelihood that any given decision will have wide-ranging
unintended consequences.
That modesty is frequently absent from the court’s recent opinions. The
justices instead routinely sling epithets at one another. Consider, for a recent
example, the dissenting opinions in Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections
Commission,361 in which the court selected from among an array of election
districting maps proposed to account for population changes following the 2020
census. Redistricting presents a complex problem, and the majority, via an
analysis that is clearly both defensible and contestable, selected the maps
proposed by Governor Evers. Chief Justice Ziegler accused the majority of “an
exercise of judicial activism,”362 and of an analysis “imbued with personal

360. Many of the court’s recent opinions put one in mind of Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins’s
analysis in NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN
DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (2019). Joseph Fishkin provocatively articulates the idea
in discussing the United States Supreme Court:
The Republican Justices no longer spend their time with a community of other
lawyers and judges of all political stripes. Instead they live in a relatively tight
discursive community of Fed Soc and Fed Soc-adjacent conservative
Republicans. In this narrower world, if you are a Supreme Court Justice, deciding
a towering case that will define a substantial part of your personal legacy, you
probably do not want to be on the side of moderation and compromise—even
faux moderation and compromise. There is no legacy in that. You want to be
with Thomas, and soak up the applause of your comrades-in-arms, even as most
of the American public finds your performance appalling, partisan, and lawless.
When you no longer spend your time talking with the general legal elite, but
instead spend most of your time within a special, even-more-elite Fed Soc cadre,
you probably want to be on the right side of the big stories your friends tell.
Joseph Fishkin, The Company They Keep, BALKINIZATION. (Dec. 2, 2021),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2021/12/the-company-they-keep.html [https://perma.cc/5NDR-FVSD].
361. 2022 WI 14.
362. Id. ¶ 66 (Ziegler, C.J., dissenting).
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preference.”363 She characterized the majority as “the other side”364 and
contended that it “picks sides and litigates for the Governor.”365 Justice
Rebecca Bradley similarly accused the majority of “[e]levating their subjective
policy preferences over the law,”366 and engaging in “(blatantly political)
policymaking”367 that amounts to “a startling departure from the rule of law.”368
In sum, she contends, “the majority abandons the law, perverts the least-change
approach into a license for policymaking, and subordinates constitutional
commands, statutory restrictions, and precedent to the majority’s
preferences.”369
It may well be, as I suggested at the outset, that the court’s decisions are a
product of the justices’ partisan leanings, whether consciously or, more likely,
otherwise. Even so, this sort of language is tiresome, unbecoming, and
subversive of the rule of law it purports to serve. As Professor Carolyn Shapiro
has observed, “there is a difference between considering judicial decisions
wrong and considering them illegitimate.”370 Charges of illegitimacy may play
well with certain crowds. But they are ultimately counter-productive and feed
the perception that the court—in its entirety—is engaged in little more than
politics dressed up as something else.
V. CONCLUSION
I advance here no grand claims about the separation of powers, under
Wisconsin law or more generally. Indeed, my reading and analysis have
convinced me most of all of the dangers of doing so. The field is vast, and the
issues are complex and contingent. The government created by the state
constitution is a unique and complex entity in which forces intersect and
interact in a wide range of ways. Any change to such a system is likely to have
unintended consequences. Law professors, like judges, are not well-equipped
to predict the effects of major changes or to anticipate those consequences, and
this one, at least, is not inclined to make bold claims about the nature of law
that would have the effect of radically realigning a constitutional framework.
363. Id. ¶ 67.
364. Id. ¶ 153.
365. Id. ¶ 174.
366. Id. ¶ 209 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
367. Id.
368. Id. ¶ 210.
369. Id. ¶ 260.
370. Carolyn Shapiro, Remarks at the Law Day Lunch Held by the McLean County (Ill.) Bar
Association 7 (May 2, 2018) (transcript on file with author). See also Carolyn Shapiro, What Members
of Congress Say About the Supreme Court and Why It Matters, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 453, 458–59
(2018).
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I hope instead to have accomplished three things. First, to have highlighted
some threads running through the doctrine, to have identified some tensions and
problem areas, and to have flagged some implications and open questions.
Second, to have offered appropriate critique of the court’s recent decisions.
While the justices have been sensitive to critique,371 they have, as discussed in
the Introduction, been unable to avoid it. If my analysis is correct, their
opinions have not aided their cause. And finally, to have demonstrated, as a
result, the virtues of judicial humility.

371. See Gabler v. Crime Victims Rts. Bd., 2017 WI 67, ¶ 57, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384
(cautioning “that reckless criticism of the courts risks undermining their role as a check on the
legislative and executive branches”); Patience Drake Roggensack, Hallows Lecture: Tough Talk and
the
Institutional
Legitimacy
of
our
Courts,
MARQ.
LAW.,
Fall
2017,
https://law.marquette.edu/assets/marquette-lawyers/pdf/marquette-lawyer/2017-fall/2017-fallp45.pdf [https://perma.cc/V683-3SDZ].

